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I. INTRODUCTION
In the next few years, courts will struggle to interpret trusts written 
decades ago to determine if class terms such as “issue” or “grandchildren” 
include children conceived using assisted reproductive technology (ART).
In some instances, ART children—those conceived using assisted insemination1 
or in vitro fertilization (IVF)2—are not genetically related to their parents 
because donated sperm or ova are used.  In other cases, because the 
intended parents employed a gestational carrier, they may adopt the child 
even if they are the biological parents.  This raises a significant issue for
these old trusts, created at a time when the common law in many states 
presumed that the settlors would only want to benefit those related to them 
by blood.  While the trust may not have stated expressly that “adoptions 
are not recognized,” most jurisdictions used the common law presumption 
to exclude a child adopted by someone other than the creator of the instrument.3 
Whether the case involved a testamentary trust with principal to “issue” 
executed in Montana in 19454 or in Tennessee in 1957,5 a 1947 South 
Carolina will giving real property to the testator’s son and then to the son’s 
“surviving children,”6 or an inter vivos trust created in Texas with future 
interests in both “children” and “issue,”7 the courts often found that these 
1. Assisted insemination, also termed artificial insemination or intrauterine insemination,
is a type of fertility treatment involving placing sperm directly in the uterus using a syringe 
or similar instrument.  Intrauterine Insemination (IUI) Overview, MAYO CLINIC (July 16, 
2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/intrauterine-insemination/about/pac-
20384722 [https://perma.cc/JXB3-T4XK].
2. With in vitro fertilization (IVF), ova—eggs—are removed from the woman and 
fertilized with sperm in the lab, allowed to develop into pre-embryos, and then placed back 
in the uterus. See What Is IVF?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparent 
hood.org/learn/pregnancy/fertility-treatments/what-ivf [https://perma.cc/M2YK-ADH2]. 
3. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Gets What 
and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate 
Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984). 
4. Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Trust of Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 886
(Mont. 1958). 
5. Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Corbitt, 474 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971). 
6.  Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 772 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985). 
7.  Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. 1961). 
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terms included only those with a blood relationship to the settlor or testator,
and excluded those adopted.8 
Cases on adoptees provide a cautionary tale on how courts should not
proceed to analyze class terms for ART children.  While many courts have 
been forced to decide whether adoptees are included in class terms,9 so
far, only one reported case has looked at whether ART children are
beneficiaries of a trust that states “adoptions shall not be recognized,”10 
while a second case has ducked the issue,11 but many more are sure to 
follow.  Today there are a large number of active trusts, and some legal 
life estates with remainders, that were created at a time when the common 
law presumption applied to exclude adoptees in many jurisdictions.12 
These trusts and estates will continue for decades, and someone will need
to figure out who constitutes the settlor’s issue, grandchildren, or nieces 
and nephews.  These beneficiaries may well include ART children, as 
thousands are born each year, many of whom are not genetically related to 
one or both parents or who are adopted even if they are related—and the
numbers are increasing.  With the widespread availability of direct-
to-consumer genetic testing, it is simple to determine if someone is
genetically related to the settlor or testator.13  The adoption cases suggest 
that when the stakes are high, the question of who should be included as 
a beneficiary may well be litigated. 
This Article analyzes applying class terms to ART children through the
lens of seventy-four deeds, inter vivos trusts, wills, and testamentary trusts 
created at a time when the vast majority of jurisdictions followed the 
common law presumption that adoptions shall not be recognized.14  All 
8. See, e.g., In re Trust of Miller, 323 P.2d at 889; Bagwell, 329 S.E.2d at 772;
Corbitt, 474 S.W.2d at 143; Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d at 516–17. 
9. See, e.g., In re Trust of Miller, 323 P.2d at 889; Bagwell, 329 S.E.2d at 772;
Corbitt, 474 S.W.2d at 143; Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d at 516–17. 
10. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879–80 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005). 
11. See McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Va. 2004). 
12. See Rein, supra note 3, at 737. 
13. SeeWhat Is Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer [https://perma.cc/
BGC7-EJQP].
14. These seventy-four documents were selected from reported cases based on three 
criteria: (1) the trust, deed, or will created a future interest in a class that could include an 
adopted—or ART—child whose parent was not the settlor or testator; (2) the interests were 
initially created at a time when the common law presumption applied in the vast majority of 
states; and (3) as many states as possible were included—only Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, 
Nevada, and North Dakota were missing from the initial database of 145.  Kristine Knaplund, 
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these documents created a future interest in a class such as issue, grandchildren,
nieces and nephews, or descendants entitled to income or principal.  Part
II will discuss ART children, and how they are like—and unlike—adopted 
children as potential class members.  Part III will detail the ways courts
have dealt with the common law presumption that class members must be
related by blood to the settlor or testator, and thus excluded those who are 
adopted. Part IV will look at four potential consequences if the common
law presumption is applied to ART children who either are not related by 
blood, or who have been adopted: invasion of privacy, stigma for children 
of same-sex couples, fracturing of family ties, and more litigation, and suggest
alternative solutions including decanting, modification, and a “rule of
construction” approach. Part V concludes the Article.
II. ART CHILDREN VS. ADOPTED CHILDREN
In the United States, the institution of adoption predates assisted
reproduction by at least 100 years. States first enacted laws on adoption
in the 1850s,15 forcing courts to decide whether a settlor or testator meant
to include adoptees in class terms.  For example, an 1851 trust of real property 
provided for the settlor’s daughter for her life and then “to convey the 
same to her children.”16  The daughter had adopted three children after the 
settlor’s death; did they qualify as beneficiaries?17  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania said no; Pennsylvania’s 1855 adoption statute made them 
her heirs but not her children.18  This presumption, known as the “stranger 
to the adoption” rule, was included in the First Restatement of Property.19 
The issue occurred often enough that some testators or settlors included
express clauses in their wills or trusts on whether those adopted by their
relatives were meant to be part of class gifts.20 
Adopted Database (June 3, 2019) (unpublished spreadsheet) (on file with author).  I then 
eliminated the intestacy cases, because those would be decided by current law, and cases
dealing with adult adoptions for reasons explained later. See infra notes 252–53. 
15. Rein, supra note 3, at 716 n.21.  Massachusetts enacted one of the first adoption 
-
statutes in 1851.  Ellen Sherman, Timeline of Adoption History, ADOPTION HIST. PROJECT
(Feb. 24, 2012), https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/JL2W
MRNK].
16.  Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, 304 (1867). 
17. Id. at 304–05. 
18. See id. at 306. 
19. See, e.g., In re Trust Under Agreement of Vander Poel, 933 A.2d 628, 634 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS 
§ 287 (AM. LAW INST. 1940). 
20. See, e.g., Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Coffin, 569 A.2d 531, 531 (Conn. 1990)
(holding that testamentary trusts included language that “issue” did not include adoptees 
and their issue); Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“The will 
defined ‘issue’ as including ‘an adopted child or children.’”); Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 
304
KNAPLUND_57-2_POST KNAPLUND PAGES-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2020 1:02 PM      
 
    
 
 
    
     
 





     
 
      
 
 
     
       
    
   
 
        
 





     
[VOL. 57:  301, 2020] Children of Assisted Reproduction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
By contrast, medical intervention for infertility in humans is much more 
recent. While assisted insemination was widely used in animals in the early 
twentieth century,21 the first study in humans was not published until 1943.22 
The ability to freeze and thaw sperm became feasible in the 1950s,23 but
courts expressed concern whether the child was legitimate24 until the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act25 declared that a consenting husband was the child’s
father.26 In vitro fertilization developed even later.  Louise Brown, the first
IVF baby, was born in England in 1978.27  Three years after Louise Brown, 
the first IVF child was born in the United States in 1981.28  It was not until
1983 that the first IVF baby was born using a donated egg.29 
Today, thousands of ART children are born each year who are not
genetically related to one or both parents, and the numbers are increasing. 
Some experts estimate that as many as 60,000 children are born via assisted
160, 163 (Tex. App. 1986) (“The use of the term ‘child’ or ‘children’ . . . shall be understood to
mean . . . legally adopted children of either of my said children.”). 
21. See R.H. Foote, The History of Artificial Insemination: Selected Notes and 
Notables, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 1, 3 (2002), https://www.asas.org/docs/publications/footehist. 
pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/85RN-HZ2D].
22. W. Ombelet & J. Van Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles and 
Milestones, 7 FACTS VIEWS & VISION OBGYN 137, 142 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4498171 [https://perma.cc/Z3D7-XBTU].
23. See id.; see also Eric M. Walters et al., The History of Sperm Cryopreservation, 
in SPERM BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 1 (Allan A. Pacey & Mathew J. Tomlinson 
eds., 2009).
24. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding 
that child conceived via assisted insemination “is not the legitimate issue of the husband”);
Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code’s Surprising Gender Inequities, 18 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 335, 337 (2011). 
25. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2002).  For
examples, see Kristine S. Knaplund, “Adoptions Shall Not Be Recognized”: The Unintended 
Consequences for Dynasty Trusts, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 545, 562 n.128 (2017). 
26. See Ombelet & Robays, supra note 22, at 142. 
27. Laura Sanders, 40 Years After the Birth of the First IVF Baby, a Look Back at
the Birth of a New Era, SCI. NEWS (July 25, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sciencenews.
org/blog/growth-curve/40-years-ivf-baby-louise-brown [https://perma.cc/PFZ3-RXAT].




29. Jeff Wang & Mark V. Sauer, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): A Review of 3 Decades of
Clinical Innovation and Technological Advancement, 2 THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL RISK 
MGMT. 355, 356 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1936357 [https:// 
perma.cc/2AUT-JZ27]. 
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insemination by donor each year in the United States.30  As for IVF, the
Centers for Disease Control track all forms of ART other than assisted 
insemination—those that involve removing the egg and fertilizing it outside 
the woman’s body—and reports that these ART procedures, while still a 
small percentage of births nationwide, have doubled in the past decade, 
and as of 2017 accounted for 1.7% of births in the United States.31  Donor 
eggs were used in 24,300 ART cycles32 in 2016,33 up from 16,976 ten
years before.34 
These numbers do not include the thousands of Americans who travel
abroad every year for fertility treatments.35 In vitro fertilization and gestational
surrogacy can cost significantly less in other countries.36  The numbers 
 30. Jacqueline Mroz, Their Children Were Conceived with Donor Sperm. It Was the 
Wrong Sperm, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/health/ 
sperm-banks-fertility-artificial-insemination.html [https://perma.cc/6J4U-8PRB]. 
31. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ art/artdata/index.html [https://perma.cc/4HEL-B29R].
32. CDC, 2016 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
46 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2016-report/ART-2016-National-Summary-Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A8VY-EPWE].  An ART cycle begins when a woman starts taking 
fertility drugs or is monitored for follicle production, and, if successful, proceeds to egg 
retrieval. Id. at 63.  The eggs—or ova—are combined with sperm and eventually planted 
in the uterus.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 46.  One reason for the increase may be pro-life groups that encourage the 
“adoption” of frozen embryos.  Jasmine Taylor-Coleman, The Americans Who ‘Adopt’ 
Other People’s Embryos, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
36450328 [https://perma.cc/FK6J-D5JT].
34. CDC, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL 
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 56 (2006), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/
2006-ART_508tagged.pdf [https://perma.cc/248R-CHVZ]. The Centers for Disease Control 
do not track ova fertilized with donated sperm. 
35. Anna Medaris Miller, Should You Travel Abroad for IVF?, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 
15, 2015),  https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2015-12-15/should-
you-travel-abroad-for-ivf [https://perma.cc/34F6-H72L] (estimating that 60,000 to 84,000 
Americans a year go outside the United States for reproductive health care); see Kevin 
Ponniah, In Search of Surrogates, Foreign Couples Descend on Ukraine, BBC NEWS (Feb.
13, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42845602 [https://perma.cc/C298-
FUAJ] (noting that surrogacies often use donor eggs); Julissa Treviño, Medical Tourism 
Is Booming in Mexico, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 9, 2018), https://psmag.com/economics/
medical-tourism-is-booming-in-mexico [https://perma.cc/4DBB-TE67] (“People most 
commonly travel to Mexico for procedures that include . . . fertility treatments.”). 
36. Compare Rachel Gurevich, How Much Does IVF Really Cost?, VERY WELL 
FAM., https://www.verywellfamily.com/how-much-does-ivf-cost-1960212 [https://perma.cc/ 
P6HM-YAGJ] (last updated Mar. 20, 2019) (providing that the average cost for one IVF 
cycle in the United States is $12,000), and CCRM Colorado: IVF Costs & Fertility Treatment 
Costs, CCRM FERTILITY, https://www.ccrmivf.com/colorado/treatment-costs [https://perma.cc/
Q4K5-2KYT] (noting that it costs $15,897 for one IVF cycle with fresh embryo transfer, 
$23,983 for frozen embryo transfer, and 15% off for Colorado residents), with Alex Sunshine,
How Much Does IVF Cost in Your Country?—All Prices Revealed, SUNSHINE EGG DONATION
AGENCY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.eggdonors.asia/blog/how-much-ivf-cost [https:// 
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also do not include children born via extramarital affairs,37 and children 
who are mistakenly switched at birth.38  They also do not include couples
who contracted for assisted insemination by husband (AIH) but instead 
unknowingly received donor sperm, either by mistake or by design.  When 
AIH was first offered in the 1950s, doctors often combined the husband’s 
sperm with donor sperm to improve results.39  While this practice had been 
largely abandoned by the late 1970s,40 some rogue doctors or their staff
continued to deliberately include their own sperm in that provided to patients.  
A doctor in Virginia fathered at least fifteen children and is suspected of 
fathering as many as seventy-five.41  At least three dozen people have learned 
through the genetic website 23andMe that a fertility doctor in Indianapolis 
is their father.42 A sperm bank founder in Great Britain is suspected of 
perma.cc/8LT5-6XUG] (listing one IVF cycle in Finland at $3,267, Korea at $1,600, Latvia at
$2,500, and United States at $10,000).  For surrogacy, West Coast Surrogacy in California 
estimates a contract at between $90,000 to $130,000. West Coast Surrogacy Costs & Fees, 
W. COAST SURROGACY, https://www.westcoastsurrogacy.com/surrogate-program-for-intended- 
parents/surrogate-mother-cost [https://perma.cc/P7K7-T74X]. The cost of a surrogacy contract 
in Ukraine is advertised as $30,000 “all inclusive” at Ela Woman.  Cost for Surrogacy (Self) in 
Ukraine, ELA WOMAN, https://www.elawoman.com/Ukraine [https:// perma.cc/S27X-2W7W]. 
37. The percentage of such children is very small, perhaps less than 1%. See Rob
Brooks, What Are the Chances That Your Dad Isn’t Your Father?, CONVERSATION (Apr.
15, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://theconversation.com/what-are-the-chances-that-your-dad-isnt-
your-father-24802 [https://perma.cc/7TJZ-4VW2] (citing estimates between 1% and 3%, 
and 0.7% and 2%); Carl Zimmer, Fathered by The Mailman? It’s Mostly an Urban 
Legend, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/science/extra-
marital-paternity-less-common-than-assumed-scientists-find.html [https://perma.cc/C7T7-
N9JE] (providing that this percentage is no more than 1%).
38.  For examples, see Knaplund, supra note 25, at 566 n.156. 
39. See S.J. Behrman, Artificial Insemination, 10 FERTILITY & STERILITY 248, 252 
(1959).
40. See Martin Curie-Cohen, Lesleigh Luttrell & Sander Shapiro, Current Practice 
of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 587 
(1979) (citing that of a 1977–1978 survey of 471 doctors who practiced assisted insemination, 
only two reported mixing donor sperm with the husband’s sperm). 
41. Doctor Is Found Guilty in Fertility Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1992), https://www.
nytimes.com/1992/03/05/us/doctor-is-found-guilty-in-fertility-case.html [https://perma.cc/
N8C2-ABCP].  The doctor was found guilty of fifty-two counts of fraud and perjury for
deliberately substituting his own sperm.  Id. 
 42. Mahir Zaveri, A Fertility Doctor Used His Own Sperm on Unwitting Women.
Their Children Want Answers., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
08/30/us/fertility-doctor-pregnant-women.html [https://perma.cc/2R4T-3DTR].  Dr. Cline,
who acknowledged using his own sperm in assisted insemination, pleaded guilty to two 
charges of obstruction of justice for lying to state investigators. Id.  By 2019, the number
of women found to have been impregnated by Dr. Cline had risen to at least forty-six. 
Mroz, supra note 30.  A former staffer at a clinic in Utah is suspected of being the biological
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fathering more than 600 children.43  In addition, problems with “switched 
embryos” have been reported, where a woman has been implanted with 
someone else’s embryo, either by mistake44 or deliberately.45  In all these
cases, at least one person raising the child is not genetically related to him 
or her. 
Will the nonbiological parent be included on the child’s birth certificate?
Today, if the parents of the ART child are married and a heterosexual 
couple, and the wife gives birth to the child, the answer is yes, even if donated
gametes are used.46  The common law marital presumption has for centuries
held that the husband of the woman who gives birth is presumed to be the 
child’s father.47  Once the technology of assisted insemination became 
available, some states enacted provisions declaring the husband, and not 
the donor, to be the father; others simply relied on the marital presumption 
to achieve the same result.48  Historically, the marital presumption had
ratified the husband as the father of his wife’s child “without too close an 
examination of biology.”49 In order to ensure the legitimacy of the child, 
the common law precluded others from asserting paternity of a married 
father of at least one child.  Laura F. Friedman, At-Home Genetic Testing Reveals a Sperm-
Swapping Nightmare, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2014, 6:19 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
23andme-test-reveals-artificial-insemination-nightmare-2014-1 [https://perma.cc/N6MW-
W943].
43. Randy Kreider, Did Sperm Bank Founder Father 600 Children?, ABC News
(Apr. 9, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/sperm-bank-founder-father-600-children/story? 
id=16104054 [https://perma.cc/TMU3-8VW6]. DNA tests on eighteen children found that
twelve were fathered by the clinic founder.  Id. 
 44. E.g., Sharon Kirkey, Switched Embryos and Wrong Sperm: IVF Mix-Ups Lead 
to Babies Born with ‘Unintended Parentage,’ NAT’L POST, https://nationalpost.com/health/
ivf-mix-ups-lead-to-babies-born-with-unintended-parentage [https://perma.cc/97E5-L3SV] 
(last updated July 31, 2016); Guilia McDonnell & Nieto Del Rio, Couple Says Their Embryo
Was Implanted into Wrong Woman. They Had to Fight to Get Their Son, L.A. TIMES (July 
11, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.latimes.com/la-me-glendale-fertility-clinic-lawsuit-20190710-
story.html [https://perma.cc/YBD6-XFMG]. 
45. See Kimi Yoshino, UCI Settles Dozens of Fertility Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
11, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-sep-11-me-uci-
fertility11-story.html [https://perma.cc/7QC7-N2DR].  For more details, see Knaplund, supra
note 25, at 564–67. 
46. See Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and Surrogacy Abroad, U.S. 
DEP’T ST.—BUREAU CONSULAR AFF., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-
legal-considerations/us-citizenship/Assisted-Reproductive-Technology-ART-Surrogacy-
Abroad.html [https://perma.cc/N6U6-3FXU].
47. Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby Without a Country: Determining Citizenship for Assisted 
Reproduction Children Born Overseas, 91 DENV. L. REV. 335, 345–46 (2014). 
48. Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2292–93
(2017).
49. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 9, 15 (2017). 
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woman’s child unless the husband had no access to his wife.  Thus, “the
law assumed, but did not in fact require, blood ties.”50 
This trend continued with states that allowed same-sex couples to marry
before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this as a fundamental right in 
Obergefell v. Hodges:51 they all held that the nonbiological spouse was 
entitled to the marital presumption, at least when there was no third party 
to rebut the presumption.52  The Supreme Court agreed in 2017, holding
that Arkansas must list a woman’s spouse on a child’s birth certificate as 
the other parent, because the state’s definition of “father,” like the definition 
in many states, was not necessarily biological.53  Thus, at least if the same-
sex couple is married, the same-sex spouse will be named as a parent on 
the birth certificate under the same criteria as a nonbiological husband.54 
In some jurisdictions, even an unmarried nonbiological partner may be 
named as a parent.55 
The issue of the birth certificate is more complicated if a gestational 
carrier is used. For heterosexual couples and lesbian couples, the option 
exists for the female partner to give birth to the child; in that case, states
will apply the presumption that the woman who gives birth is the mother, 
and list her as such on the birth certificate.56  If a gestational carrier is
used, however, then the woman who gives birth is not intended to be the 
one who raises the child. The Centers for Disease Control define a “gestational 
carrier” or “gestational surrogate” as “[a] woman who gestates, or carries, 
an embryo that was formed from the egg of another woman with the 
50. Nejaime, supra note 48, at 2272. 
51.  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
52. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marriage Presumption Post-
Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 667 (2016). 
53.  Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017). 
 54. Nejaime, supra note 48, at 2294, 2363 app. A, 2373 app. D. An unmarried
partner with no genetic or legal link to the child may be in a different legal position, as 
a Michigan court held in Sheardown v. Gustella. 920 N.W.2d 172, 178 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2018) (concluding no standing to assert child custody for female in same-sex unmarried 
couple who was not genetically related to child). 
55. Nejaime, supra note 48, at 2370 app. C; see also, e.g., In re Dee J., 13 N.E.3d 
627, 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (finding that a same-sex couple married in Iowa in 2009 and 
treated as unmarried in Illinois, which did not recognize validity of marriage until June 1, 
2014, had a child conceived through assisted insemination by donor with express consent 
of nonbiological partner who cared for child after she was born, and court held that 
nonbiological partner was parent). 
56. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (Deering 2019). 
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expectation of returning the infant to its intended parents.”57  Some states 
will issue a “pre-birth order” or its equivalent to allow the intended parents, 
rather than the gestational carrier and her spouse, to be named as the child’s 
parents on the birth certificate.58  In other states, however, the intended parents 
will adopt the child even though their gametes were used by the gestational 
carrier, because the gestational carrier gave birth and is therefore the 
presumed mother.59 
Even if the spouse’s or partner’s name is on the birth certificate, if the
couple is same-sex, it is clear to all that both members of the couple cannot 
be the genetic parents of the child.  Thus, a subgroup of ART children is different
from the others. With many ART children—those conceived using donated
sperm or ova by a heterosexual couple—there is no reason for others to 
know of a third party’s involvement unless the couple discloses it.  Unless 
a heterosexual couple is open about their reproductive struggles, others may 
not know that donated sperm or ova were used.  But if someone has reason
to know of the use of ART, the adoption cases suggest that when enough 
money is involved, others are willing to press the issue as to whether the 
ART children should be excluded from the class.60 
III. THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION EXCLUDING ADOPTEES, 
AND ITS APPLICATION TO ART CHILDREN 
Inheritance at common law was based on blood relationships.61  The 
one exception was for a spouse;62 even stepchildren, who may have been
raised as family members for years, would not inherit in intestacy under 
57. CDC, supra note 32, at 64. 
58. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e) (2019).  Delaware allows a pre-birth order 
to name the intended parents but stays enforcement until after the child’s birth.  DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-611(b) (2019). 
59. In Nebraska, for example, the gestational carrier is listed as the mother on the 
birth certificate with the biological father; the intended mother then adopts the child and 
moves to amend the birth certificate.  Diane Hinson, Gestational Surrogacy in Nebraska, 
CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy- 
law-map/nebraska [https://perma.cc/847P-UNAW].  In Alabama, while obtaining a pre-
birth order is “sometimes possible, . . . post-birth adoptions are considered an easier and
more efficient alternative.”  Diane Hinson, Gestational Surrogacy in Alabama, CREATIVE 
FAM. CONNECTIONS, https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/
alabama [https://perma.cc/9V44-HZ29].  In Florida, an order to name the intended parents 
on the birth certificate can only be made after the child is born.  Diane Hinson, Gestational 
Surrogacy in Florida, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/
us-surrogacy-law-map/florida [https://perma.cc/Q7FU-9PFE]. 
60. See infra Part III. 
61. See Rein, supra note 3, at 713–16. 
62. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 49–50 (4th ed. 2010). 
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most statutes.63  Once states started enacting legislation allowing adoption 
in the 1850s,64 courts presumed that a settlor or testator who did not name 
a specific adopted grandchild or niece but rather used a class term did not 
mean to include anyone other than those related to her by consanguinity.65 
As the Virginia Supreme Court explained, “At common law, adopted
persons were not included within the term ‘issue,’ because that term was
limited to the ‘natural descendants of a common ancestor,’ was synonymous 
with lineal descendant, and connoted a ‘common blood stream.’”66  This 
presumption, often termed “stranger to the adoption,” applied when a person 
was adopted by someone other than the creator of the instrument.67  Absent 
contrary intent, the adopted person would be excluded from the class. 
The same assumption of a preference of blood relatives applied for settlors
of inter vivos trusts.  As one court said: “Ever since 1842, the statutory
definition has been that ‘[t]he word “issue” . . . shall include all the lawful
lineal descendants of the ancestor.’  Our courts have interpreted the statute
[to include] . . . only the descendants in the blood line of the ancestor and 
excluding adopted children.”68 
Courts in the adoption cases used four approaches to discern intent
when an express clause as to adoptees was lacking, all the while admitting 
that the maker did not appear to consider the issue.  As one court said, “The
court’s endeavor is to put itself in testator’s position in so far as possible in
the effort to accomplish what he would have done had he ‘envisioned the 
present inquiry.’”69  Commentators at the time agreed that courts were trying 
to discern “intent” in cases where none truly existed.70  As one author stated, 
63. Id. at 107. 
64. See Sherman, supra note 15. 
65. See, e.g., Rein, supra note 3, at 797–98. 
66. McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Va. 2004) (citations omitted) (first 
quoting Munday v. Munday, 178 S.E. 917, 919 (Va. 1935); and then quoting Fletcher v. 
Flanary, 38 S.E.2d 433, 435 (Va. 1946)); accord In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821, 822 (Me. 
1907); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 772 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Union Planters
Nat’l Bank v. Corbitt, 474 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Ten. Ct. App. 1971). 
67. See, e.g., In re Trust Under Agreement of Vander Poel, 933 A.2d 628, 634 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also In re Estate of Wehrhane, 128 A.2d 681, 689 (1957) 
(Weintraub, J., dissenting), overruled in part by In re Coe’s Estate, 201 A.2d 571 (N.J. 
1964). 
68.  Amoskeag Tr. Co. v. Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 159 (N.H. 1966). 
69. In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 723 (N.J. Prob. Ct. 1976) (quoting Fidelity 
Union Tr. Co. v. Robert, 178 A.2d 185, 187 (N.J. 1962)). 
70. J. Wesley Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children
Are Concerned: I, 43 MICH. L. REV. 705, 708–09 (1945). 
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“A real intention, of course, is seldom discoverable. The ‘intention’ . . .
largely represents a union of judicially envisaged social desirability with 
conjecture as to what the conveyor probably would have intended had he 
thought about the matter.”71 Another writer agreed: “The very fact that the
difficulty has arisen is often the clearest proof that the testator or settlor 
never thought of the matter at all, for if he had, it is hardly possible that 
he would not have expressed his desires in the clearest terms.”72 
The first approach, followed by many states, considered only facts and
law evident at the time the document was executed; subsequent events were 
disregarded. “The object of a court in construing a will is to ascertain the 
testator’s intent at the time it was executed,”73 one court declared.  “Whether
[an adoptee] is entitled to an interest in the trust estates depends upon the 
intention of the settlors, and their intention as it existed at the time the trusts 
were created is determinative.”74  Another court was even clearer:
[T]he fact that the child was not adopted until after the execution of the will
precludes an intent to include the child.  It is suggested that, as the testator permitted
his will to stand after hearing of the adoption, an inference arises that he intended 
that the child should take his adopting parents’ place in the event of the latter’s
death.  The inference is not permissible.  The will speaks the testamentary intention 
as of its date; its effect is as of the testator’s death.75 
This group applied the law in effect when the instrument was written.
Some courts asserted that “the testator is bound to know the existing statutes
affecting testamentary dispositions,”76 and thus whether an adoptee was 
an “heir,” for example.  The law, including cases, intestacy succession, and 
other statutes, plus the public policy of the state at the time the will or trust 
was executed, could be taken into account, and the court may “impute 
knowledge of this law and policy to the testator.”77  One court stated categorically
71. Id.
72. Albert M. Kales, Rights of Adopted Children, 9 ILL. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (1914); 
see also MAX RHEINSTEIN, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES: INTESTACY, WILLS, PROBATE 
AND ADMINISTRATION 385 (2d ed. 1955) (“What we carry out is not . . . the testator’s real 
intention but rather his hypothetical intention, the intention which he is likely to have had 
if he had his mind applied to the problem.”); William B. Rector, Jr., Note, Wills— 
Construction—Right of Adopted Children To Take Under a Will as “Grandchildren,” 39 
N.C. L. REV. 203, 205 (1961) (“With reference to this class of cases it has been said that 
‘the only legitimate inference from the context and surrounding circumstances is that the 
testator . . . has no actual intention whatever in respect to the difficulty which afterwards 
arises by the appearance of an adopted child.” (citing Kales, supra, at 159)). 
73. Young v. First Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell), 184 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Wis. 
1971).
74.  Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 519 (Tex. 1961). 
75.  Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 102, 105 (N.J. Ch. 1932). 
76.  Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse, 129 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527 (Ct. App. 1976). 
77.  Estate of Pittman, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 529 (Ct. App. 1980). 
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that “[t]he current statutory law and public policy is irrelevant.”78 Some 
courts saw it as a matter of fairness to the one creating the document: “[O]ne 
executing a will or trust is entitled to rely on the law in effect at the time 
the instrument is created.”79 
A second approach was more lenient: as long as the will or trust was 
revocable, events subsequent to its execution should be taken in account, 
on the theory that the testator or settlor who knew of any changes could
have revised the will or trust.  As one court noted:
The testator . . . had ample time to change his will in order to rule out his adopted
grandsons as ‘grandchildren,’ if he so desired, which he did not do. This fact 
provided further evidence that he approved of the adoptions and wanted the boys
to share in his estate.80 
Another court refused to apply a change in the presumption retroactively: 
“In our opinion, the testator intended that his will should be construed
under the law prevailing at the time of his death.  So construed, the terms 
of the trust did not include adopted children of those collateral relatives 
of the testator who were the primary beneficiaries.”81  A Tennessee statute
expressly states that a will is construed as if it were executed immediately 
82 prior to the testator’s death.
In a third group of states, courts disregarded the common law presumption 
by retroactively applying legislation that included adoptees in class terms.
In Evans v. McCoy, for example, an 1897 will created a defeasible fee in
the testator’s daughter and son, but if they died without surviving issue, 
to the testator’s brothers.83 Almost eighty years later, the daughter, who 
had no children, adopted two adults.84  After her death, her brother’s sons
brought an action in ejectment.85  The Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the 1947 statute eliminating Maryland’s stranger to the adoption rule could 
be applied retroactively to the 1897 will because it was a rule of construction, 
and membership in a class was determined by the law in effect when the 
78. In re Will of Mitchell, 184 N.W.2d at 857. 
79. Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 28 (Mass. 2012) (declaring
that a 2009 retroactive statute as applied to an irrevocable, pre-1958 testamentary instrument 
was unconstitutional). 
80. Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1197 (Conn. 1991); 
accord Weitzel v. Weitzel, 239 N.E.2d 263, 269 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1968). 
81.  Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 750 (Tenn. 1988). 
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-101 (2019); see Calhoun, 763 S.W.2d at 748. 
83.  436 A.2d 436, 437 (Md. 1981). 
84. Id.
 85. Id. at 438. 
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class closes, not when the creator of the instrument dies.86  Similarly,
Michigan’s 1966 statute reversing the common law presumption was held 
to apply to a 1936 will, on the theory that the legislature’s language left 
them no discretion: “Section 128 provides that the term ‘“issue” . . . shall 
be construed to include any adopted person.’ This language is mandatory 
and leaves no room for a court to carve out an exception where the settlor’s 
death preceded the enactment of § 128.”87 
Finally, as a fourth approach two states, California and Hawaii, did not
follow the common law presumption excluding adopted children.  In In re
Estate of Stanford, the Supreme Court of California was asked to construe a
will executed in 1903, and the court ruled that “[i]t has been the policy of 
this state, at least since the adoption of the Civil Code, to accord to adopted 
children the same status as natural children.”88 Similarly, a California
Court of Appeal interpreted a 1933 irrevocable trust to include great-
grandchildren adopted after the trust was created: “As early as 1888 it was 
established in California that the word ‘issue’ included both adopted and 
natural children.”89 In Hawaii, the state supreme court faced the issue 
of whether a grandchild adopted eighteen years after the 1896 irrevocable 
deed of trust was meant to be included as “lawful issue.”90  Noting the “ancient
customs of [Hawaiian] people had not only sanctioned adoptions and 
regarded adopted children as children of the blood,” the court included the 
adoptee in the class.91 
How might a court discern intent in the case of ART children when the
testator or executor most likely never considered the possibility? The 
science involved, especially for in vitro fertilization, is much later than
virtually all of our seventy-four wills, trusts, and deeds.92 Nearly three-
quarters of the documents were in effect before 1945,93 and thus before
86. Id. at 437; accord Bowles v. Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. 1995)
(applying rule of construction); see First Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 131–32 (Ill. 
1995) (discussing that the rule is procedural, not substantive, so it may be applied 
retroactively). 
87. Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Mich.
1985); cf. Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8, 9 (Me. 1985) (construing similar language to 
apply only to testators who died after the effective date of Maine’s statute). 
88.  315 P.2d 681, 689 (Cal. 1957). 
89.  Wells Fargo Bank v. Huse, 129 Cal. Rptr. 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1976). 
90.  O’Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 108 (1939). 
91. Id. at 116, 136; accord In re Estate of Cunha, 49 Haw. 273, 297 (1966). 
92. See, e.g., Ashley Eskew & Emily Jungheim, A History of Developments to 
Improve In Vitro Fertilization, 114 MO. MED., May–June 2017, at 156, 156–59. 
93. See Peck v. Green, 96 So. 2d 169, 172 (Ala. 1956); Bank of Am. v. Most
Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons (In re Estate of Heard), 319 P.2d 
637, 638 (Cal. 1957); In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948); Conn. Nat’l Bank 
& Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Conn. 1991); Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Bovey (In re Estate of Walker), 292 A.2d 899, 900 (Conn. 1972); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 
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even assisted insemination was routinely used in humans; the last of the
documents became effective in 1979, a year after IVF was first successful,
and two years before the first IVF baby was born in the United States.94 
While testators or executors creating wills or trusts in the 1920s, 1930s,
or 1940s might well have had an opinion about adopted relatives, they 
would have had no reason to anticipate kin created through ART, and so 
trying to discern their intent on the matter is impossible. Thus, ART children 
differ significantly from adopted children in the matter of the maker’s 
intent in these old documents: the creator never considered children conceived 
with a third-party’s sperm or ova.  The problem is, this separates certain
ART children—those conceived with donated gametes—from others—those 
who are genetically related to the testator or settlor but were adopted because
2d 235, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); First Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ill. 
1995); Sennot v. Collet-Oser, 344 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Lutz v. Fortune, 
758 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1925); Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 334 (Iowa 1983); Cook v. Underwood, 
228 N.W. 629, 630 (Iowa 1930); In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 217
(Me. 2017); Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 397 (Me. 1963); In re Woodcock,
68 A. 821, 821 (Me. 1907); Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 25
(Mass. 2012); Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 
1985); Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816, 816 
(Mich. 1967); Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313, 314 (Miss. 1948); Kindred v. Anderson, 
209 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo. 1948); Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. 1942);
Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); Amoskeag
Tr. Co. v. Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 159 (N.H. 1966); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 394
(N.J. 1969); Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 55 (N.J. 1925); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 
102, 104 (N.J. Ch. 1932); Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 
36 (App. Div. 1965); In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 652 (N.Y. 1910); Peele v. Finch, 200 
S.E.2d 635, 638 (N.C. 1973); Allen v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per
curiam); Bradford v. Johnson, 75 S.E.2d 632, 633 (N.C. 1953); Ohio Citizens Bank v.
Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ohio 1989); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio
1986); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 267 (Okla. 1967); Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 
797, 798 (Pa. 1972); In re Estate of Fownes,  220 A.2d 8, 9 (Pa. 1966); In re Trust of 
Pennington, 219 A.2d 353, 355 (Pa. 1966); In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d 883, 884 (Pa. 
1960); In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601, 601 (Pa. 1918); R.I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Hooker,
219 A.2d 772, 773 (R.I. 1966); Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 499 (S.C. 1973);
Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 744 (Tenn. 1988); Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 
513, 515 (Tex. 1961); Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); In re
Smith’s Will, 112 A. 897, 897 (Vt. 1921); Langhorne v. Langhorne, 186 S.E.2d 50, 50 
(Va. 1972); McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Va. 2004); Trueax v. Black, 335 
P.2d 52, 52 (Wash. 1959); Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 501
(W. Va. 1977); Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 115 (W. Va. 1967), 
overruled by Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977); 
Young v. First Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell), 184 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Wis. 1971). 
94. See Sanders, supra note 27. 
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a gestational carrier was named as their mother on the birth certificate.
This bifurcation would encourage genetic testing, a result which is undesirable 
for reasons detailed in Part IV. 
The issue of the document creator’s intent arises only in those jurisdictions
that follow the first or second approaches to the adoption cases: those that
follow the common law presumption that a class term excludes those that 
are not biologically related to the settlor or testator, such as adoptees.
Instruments in states that follow the third or fourth approaches are not a 
problem for us.  The third approach would retroactively apply a presumption 
that adoptees, or those not related by blood to the settlor or testator, are 
included in class terms absent contrary evidence, and so presumably ART
children would be included.  Those following the fourth approach, California
and Hawaii, did not exclude adoptees from class terms.  However, many
states still follow the first and second approaches,95 and so we need to explore
the consequences of applying the common law presumption to these old 
trusts. 
Courts following the first two approaches engaged in a highly detailed, 
fact specific examination of the circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the document and various personal circumstances of the creator’s family. 
A presumption that “children” did not include adoptees was defeated by 
testimony that the testator knew his daughter could not have children and 
encouraged her to adopt,96 or the fact that the testator knew of the adoption 
with ample time to change his will if he desired to exclude such child.97 
Including nonblood relatives as beneficiaries of the will or trust might also
demonstrate a willingness to include adoptees in a class term such as
“lawful issue.”98  The testimony of the drafting attorney that the testator
or settlor had expressed a desire to include adoptees could be persuasive.99 
Testimony by the testator’s wife that he would disinherit his nephew if he 
adopted two children as planned was regarded as convincing in another
case: the wife had an income interest in the testamentary trust but did not 
stand to gain if the adopted children were excluded.100  In contrast, testimony 
95. See Knaplund, supra note 25, at 570–71. 
96.  Ziehl v. Maine Nat’l Bank, 383 A.2d 1364, 1373 (Me. 1978). 
97. Chadwick, 585 A.2d at 1196–97; Bradford, 75 S.E.2d at 636–27; cf. Dulfon, 162 A.
at 105 (refusing to consider post-execution facts). 
98. Penland v. Agnich, 940 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App. 1997) (construing 1945 
will with bequests to the testator’s wife’s nephew and to his wife’s siblings, including her 
half-brothers). 
99. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. First Nat’l Bank, 348 So. 2d. 1359, 1366 (Ala. 1977)
(construing a testamentary trust); Parker v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 853 (Conn. 1969) 
(construing a testamentary trust). 
100. In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948). 
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from the one who stood to take all in place of the adoptee was found to be 
of “insufficient weight and value to overcome the usual presumption.”101 
Courts paid particular attention to the precise wording of the class gift. 
The terminology most frequently causing concern was “issue” (40%),
“descendants” (4%), or a combination of the two “issue or descendants,”
“issue/descendants” (3%), for a total of 47% of the sample.102  Next in
frequency was “children” (32%) and variations such as “child and issue” 
(5%) for a total of 37%; “bodily issue” or “bodily heirs” (5%), “grandchildren” 
and variations such as “grandchildren and issue” (5%), and finally “heirs” 
and “heirs by” a particular person (4%).103  Stepchildren were adopted in
101. In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562, 569–70 (Iowa 1985) (ruling on a 
declaratory action to resolve whether an adopted granddaughter was included in “issue” 
where her uncle, the testator’s son who would receive all of the inheritance instead of adoptee, 
testified that testator intended to distinguish between adopted and natural children). 
102. For cases using the terminology issue, see Bilsky v. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d 901,
901 (Ark. 1970); Bank of Am. v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons 
(In re Estate of Heard), 319 P.2d 637, 638 (Cal. 1957); Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Coffin, 
569 A.2d 531, 531 (Conn. 1990); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980); Nunnally , 252 S.E.2d 468,469 (Ga. 1979); Sennot , 344 N.E.2d 783, 783 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1976); Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562, 562 (Iowa 1985); In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 
170 A.3d 215, 216 (Me. 2017); Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 396 (Me. 
1963); Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Mass. 2012); Fithian v. 
Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 1985); Veneklasen v. 
Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816, 816 (Mich. 1967); Everett v. 
Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313, 314 (Miss. 1948); Kindred v. Anderson, 209 S.W.2d 912, 912 
(Mo. 1948); Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. 1942); Miller v. First Nat’l Bank 
& Tr. Co. (In re Trust of Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 885 (Mont. 1958); Amoskeag Tr. Co. v. 
Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 159 (N.H. 1966); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 393 (N.J. 1969); 
Peele v. Finch, 200 S.E.2d 635, 635 (N.C. 1973); In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d 8, 8 
(Pa. 1966); In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353, 353 (Pa. 1966); Bowles v. Bradley, 
461 S.E.2d 811, 811 (S.C. 1995); Penland, 940 S.W.2d at 324; Makoff v. Makoff, 528 
P.2d 797, 797 (Utah 1974); In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. 393, 395 (Cir. Ct. 
2001); In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); In re Smith’s 
Will, 112 A. 897, 897 (Vt. 1921); Langhorne v. Langhorne, 186 S.E.2d 50, 50 (Va. 1972); 
Young v. First Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell), 184 N.W.2d 853, 853 (Wis. 1971).  
For cases using the terminology “descendants,” see First Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 
127, 127 (Ill. 1995); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 744 (Tenn. 1988); McGehee 
v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Va. 2004).  For cases using the terminology “issue and 
descendants,” see Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8, 8 (Me. 1985); Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re 
Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (App. Div. 1965). 
103. For cases using the terminology “children,” see Zimmerman, 348 So. 2d at 
1360; Peck v. Green, 96 So. 2d 169, 169 (Ala. 1956); In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d at 3; 
Parker v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 853 (Conn. 1969); Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 79 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925); Ziehl v. 
Maine Nat’l Bank, 383 A.2d 1364, 1364 (Me. 1978); In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821, 821 
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13% of the cases.104  Only two of the cases had express language on adoptees: 
inter vivos and testamentary trusts executed by one father for his son and 
the son’s issue excluded adoptees,105 and a testamentary trust included adoptees 
in the term “issue.”106  The cases ranged from 1906 to 2017, with a median
of 1972, a bottom quartile of 1958 and below, and the top quartile at 1985 
and above.107  The most common document was the testamentary trust (60%),108 
followed by wills (19%), inter vivos trusts (16%), and deeds (5%).109  The
(Me. 1907); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); 
Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 55 (N.J. 1925); In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 652 (N.Y. 1910);
Allen v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per curiam); Bradford v. Johnson, 75
S.E.2d 632, 632 (N.C. 1953); Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ohio 
1986); In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d 883, 883 (Pa. 1960); Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d
797, 797 (Pa. 1972); In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601, 601 (Pa. 1918); R.I. Hosp. Tr. 
Co. v. Hooker, 219 A.2d 772, 774 (R.I. 1966); Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 499 (S.C. 
1973); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 771 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Cochran v.
Cochran, 95 S.W. 731, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Trueax v. Black, 335 P.2d 52, 52 
(Wash. 1959); Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 499 (W. Va. 
1977). For cases using a variation of the terminology “children” such as “child and issue,” 
see In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d at 3; Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. 1961); 
Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1967), overruled by 
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).  For cases using
the term “bodily issue” or “bodily heirs,” see Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 333 (Iowa
1983); Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 833 (Miss. 1988); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d
878, 878 (Ohio 1986); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 266 (Okla. 1967). For cases 
using the terminology “grandchildren” and its variants, see Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1189 (Conn. 1991); In re Maloney Trust, 377 N.W.2d 791, 792 
(Mich. 1985); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 102, 102 (N.J. Ch. 1932); Ortega v. First
Republicbank Fort Worth, 792 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1990).  For cases that use the 
terminology “heirs” and “heirs by,” see Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 924 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2003); Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 630 (Iowa 1930); Alley v. Strickland, 
302 S.E.2d 866, 866 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam). 
104. For cases that involved stepchildren, see Zimmerman, 348 So. 2d at 1362; 
Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 876, 877 (Ala. 1976); Coffin, 569 A.2d at 531; In re 
Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d at 563; Silsbee, 187 A.2d at 398; Kindred, 209 S.W.2d at 
914; In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d at 10; Makoff, 528 P.2d at 798; In re Trusts of Sollid, 
647 P.2d at 1035; Hanes, 237 S.E.2d at 501. 
105. Coffin, 569 A.2d at 532. 
106. In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. at 395. 
107. See the cases in Appendices A–D, of which 25% of cases occurred before 1958, 
50% of the cases occurred before 1972, and 75% of the case occurred before 1985. 
108.  This includes one life insurance trust. 
109. For cases that included a testamentary trust, see Zimmerman, 348 So. 2d at 
1360; Peck v. Green, 96 So. 2d 169, 169 (Ala. 1956); Bilsky v. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d 901,
901 (Ark. 1970); Bank of Am. v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted 
Masons (In re Estate of Heard), 319 P.2d 637, 637 (Cal. 1957); In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948); Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1189 
(Conn. 1991); Coffin, 569 A.2d at 531 (Conn. 1990); Parker v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 851 
(Conn. 1969); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nunnally 
v. Tr. Co. Bank, 252 S.E.2d 468, 468 (Ga. 1979), aff’d, 261 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 1979); First 
Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 127 (Ill. 1995); Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 77 
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years in which the documents were first effective covered a wide range, 
from 1868 to 1979, with a median of 1935; the bottom quartile was 1920 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d at 564; Scribner v. Berry, 489
A.2d 8, 8 (Me. 1985); Ziehl v. Maine Nat’l Bank, 383 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1978);
Silsbee, 187 A.2d at 396; Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 21 (Mass. 
2012); Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 1985); 
Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816, 817 (Mich. 
1967); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); Miller 
v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Trust of Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 885 (Mont. 1958); 
Amoskeag Tr. Co. v. Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 159 (N.H. 1966); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 
393, 394 (N.J. 1969); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 102, 102 (N.J. Ch. 1932); Hutton v. 
Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33 (App. Div. 1965); In re Leask, 
90 N.E. 652, 652 (N.Y. 1910); Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Andrews, 142 S.E.2d 182, 
182 (N.C. 1965); Bradford v. Johnson, 75 S.E.2d 632, 632 (N.C. 1953); Moore v. 
McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 266 (Okla. 1967); Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 797 (Pa. 1972); 
In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d 883, 883 (Pa. 1960); In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A.
601, 601 (Pa. 1918); R.I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Hooker, 219 A.2d 772, 772 (R.I. 1966); Bowles 
v. Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 811 (S.C. 1995); Pate v. Ford, 360 S.E.2d 145, 146 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1987), rev’d, 376 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1989); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 
744 (Tenn. 1988); Ortega v. First Republicbank Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452, 452 
(Tex. 1990); Penland v. Agnich, 940 S.W.2d 324, 324 (Tex. App. 1997); In re Smith’s 
Will, 112 A. 897, 897 (Vt. 1921); Langhorne v. Langhorne, 186 S.E.2d 50, 50 (Va. 1972); 
In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. at 393; In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d at 1034; 
Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1967), overruled by 
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977); Young v. First 
Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell), 184 N.W.2d 853, 853 (Wis. 1971).  For cases that 
included a will, see Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925); Cook v. 
Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 630 (Iowa 1930); In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821, 821 (Me. 1907); 
Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 833 (Miss. 1988); Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313, 314 
(Miss. 1948); Kindred, 209 S.W.2d at 914); Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. 
1942); Peele v. Finch, 200 S.E.2d 635, 635 (N.C. 1973); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 
879 (Ohio 1986); Alley v. Strickland, 302 S.E.2d 866, 866 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam); 
Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 499 (S.C. 1973); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 
771 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); 
Trueax v. Black, 335 P.2d 52, 52 (Wash. 1959).  For cases that included an inter vivos 
trust, see Whitfield, 334 So. 2d at 876; Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 900 
(Conn. 1972); Sennot v. Collet-Oser, 344 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); In re 
George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 216 (Me. 2017); In re Maloney Trust, 377 
N.W.2d 791, 791 (Mich. 1985); Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206, 1206 (Ohio 
1986); In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d at 8; Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Tex. 
1961); Makoff, 528 P.2d at 798; McGehee v. Edwards 597, S.E.2d 99, 100 (Va. 2004); In 
re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d at 1034; Hanes, 237 S.E.2d at 499.  For cases that included a 
deed, see Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 924 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); Skoog v. Fredell, 
332 N.W.2d 333, 333 (Iowa 1983); Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 55 (N.J. 1925); Allen 
v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per curiam). 
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and earlier, and the top quartile was 1945 or later.110  The gap between the
effective date of the instrument and the date of decision was very wide, 
with a range of five to one hundred ten years and a median of thirty-six 
years; the bottom quartile was nineteen years or fewer, and the top quartile 
was forty-nine years or more.111 The interests in dispute in 85% of the cases
were either the principal (64%) or the remainder (21%), with disputes over 
an income interest in 15% of the cases.112  The remaining two cases involved 
a defeasible fee and a sale restraint.113 
How did courts using the first two approaches interpret this terminology?
Not surprisingly, results varied.  The Arkansas Supreme Court declared 
that the phrase “without issue” was a technical term similar to “heirs of
the body,” neither of which included adoptees.114  “Lawful issue,” which the 
testator equated to the children of his sons, opined a New Jersey court, 
“meant his sons’ children begot, as in Genesis; those of his loins, the stock 
110. See the cases in Appendices A–D, of which 25% of the cases had documents 
first effective before 1920, 50% effective before 1935, and 75% effective before 1945. 
111.  See the cases in Appendices A–D. 
112. For cases that involved the principal, see Zimmerman, 348 So. 2d at 1362; Peck, 
96 So. 2d at 169; Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d at 901–02; In re Estate of Heard, 319 P.2d at 639– 
40; In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d at 3; Chadwick, 585 A.2d at 1190; Bovey, 292 A.2d at 
900; Parker, 255 A.2d at 852; Lewis, 389 So. 2d at 242; Nunnally, 252 S.E.2d at 468; 
King, 651 N.E.2d at 128; Sennot, 344 N.E.2d at 784–85; Lutz, 758 N.E.2d at 79; In re 
Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d at 564; In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d at 
217; Scribner, 489 A.2d at 8; Ziehl, 383 A.2d at 1366; Silsbee, 187 A.2d at 397–98; In re 
Estates of Leggett, 378 N.W.2d at 467; In re Estate of Graham, 150 N.W.2d at 817; Melek, 
250 S.W. at 615; In re Trust of Miller, 323 P.2d at 886; Preston, 222 A.2d at 161; In re 
Thompson, 250 A.2d at 394; Ahlemeyer, 131 A. at 55; Dulfon, 162 A. at 103; In re 
Washburn’s Will, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 33, 36–37; In re Leask, 90 N.E. at 652; Bradford, 75
S.E.2d at 632; Mills, 543 N.E.2d at 1207; Moore, 428 P.2d at 267–68; Estate of Tafel, 296 
A.2d at 798; In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d at 9; In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 
353, 355 (Pa. 1966); In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d at 885; In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 
104 A. at 601; Bowles, 461 S.E.2d at 812; Pate, 360 S.E.2d at 149; Calhoun, 763 S.W.2d 
at 745–56; Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d at 514–15; Penland, 940 S.W.2d at 325; Langhorne, 186 
S.E.2d at 51; In re Smith’s Will, 112 A. at 897; Hanes, 237 S.E.2d at 501; Willim, 153 
S.E.2d at 115–16; In re Mitchell’s Will, 184 N.W.2d at 855. For cases involving 
remainders, see Brown, 97 S.W.3d at 925; Casper, 146 N.E. at 123; Skoog, 332 N.W.2d 
at 333; Cook, 228 N.W. at 630; In re Woodcock, 68 A. at 821; Posey, 528 So. 2d at 833; 
Everett, 33 So. 2d at 315; Graves, 163 S.W.2d at 546; Peele, 200 S.E.2d at 635; Allen, 132 
S.E.2d at 909; Tootle, 490 N.E.2d at 883; Alley, 302 S.E.2d at 866; Turner, 196 S.E.2d at 
499; Bagwell, 329 S.E.2d at 771; Cochran, 95 S.W. at 733; Trueax, 335 P.2d at 52–53.  
For cases involving income interest, see Whitfield, 334 So. 2d at 877; Lewis, 389 So. 2d at 
240; King, 651 N.E.2d at 128; In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d at 216; Bird 
Anderson, 974 N.E.2d at 24; In re Maloney Trust, 377 N.W.2d at 792; Andrews, 142 
S.E.2d at 183; Hooker, 219 A.2d at 773–74; Ortega, 792 S.W.2d at 453; Makoff, 528 P.2d 
at 798; In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d at 1034. 
113. See Kindred, 209 S.W.2d at 912; In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. at 393. 
114. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d at 903; accord Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Corbitt, 474 
S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971). 
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of which he was the ancestor; and not children artificially created by
law.”115  Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court declared that, “The word 
‘issue’ in its commonly accepted sense means ‘issue of the body, offspring, 
progeny, natural children, physically born or begotten by the person named 
as parent.’”116  Some courts stated that “issue” meant the same as 
“descendants,” thus excluding adoptees;117 others found the two different.118 
A Texas court held that by changing the class term in his will from 
“descendants” to “issue,” the testator “expressed an intent that only blood 
relatives . . . be included in the class of remaindermen.”119  A remainder
to “children” might exclude adoptees,120 or might be presumed to include
them.121  Using more specific language, such as “children . . . born to” the
settlor’s son122 or a daughter’s heirs “by” a particular person123 meant 
adopted children were excluded. As an Alabama court observed, “Had the 
trustor intended that adopted children be included in his irrevocable trust 
it is passing strange that he would specifically use the words ‘born to my 
son.’ It seems obvious he intended to favor his blood descendants with 
115. Dulfon, 162 A. at 105. 
116. In re Trust of Miller, 323 P.2d at 886 (quoting In re Kay’s Estate, 260 P.2d 291, 
294 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1953)). 
117. See, e.g., Schapira v. Conn. Bank & Tr. Co., 528 A.2d 367, 370 (Conn. 1987)
(upholding trial court determination that “the term ‘issue’ primarily signifies descendants 
of the body, and that in the absence of a contrary intent of the settlor, adopted children are 
presumed to be excluded”); Everett, 33 So. 2d at 315 (“[T]he term ‘issue’ in common 
parlance and as used generally by the community signifies lineal descendants,—and 
certainly adopted children are not lineal descendants.”). 
118. See, e.g., In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. 1966) (“This case under 
the language of this trust [to the issue per stirpes] is clearly distinguishable from Collins’
Estate where the crucial word involved was ‘descendants.’” (citations omitted)); Bowles 
v. Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813–14 (S.C. 1995) (“Since long before 1959, ‘issue’ has been 
held to embrace all lineal descendants of a settlor.”). 
119.  Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App. 1986). 
120. Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 902 (Conn. 1972) (“[T]he word 
‘children,’ in its primary meaning connotes blood relationship and except where the testator or 
settlor is the adopting parent, will not be construed as embracing an adopted child unless 
a clear intent appears that the word be given a more extended meaning.” (quoting Parker 
v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 853 (Conn. 1969))). 
121. Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1196 (Conn. 1991)
(“In view of this type of adoption statute, words such as ‘children’ and ‘grandchildren’ are 
more likely used to include adopted children than words which distinctly and emphatically 
connote lineal blood relationship, such as ‘issue’ or ‘descendants.’”). 
122. E.g., Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 876, 877 (Ala. 1976). 
123. E.g., Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). 
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the fruit of his bounty.”124  Even after declaring that adopted persons were
generally included in class terms,125 the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals found the language employed by a testator, “a child or children . . . 
born of her body,” to be clear and unambiguous in requiring a biological 
origin and thus excluding adoptees.126  Similarly, limiting a remainder to
great-grandchildren “born after my death” meant that adoptees were not 
beneficiaries of the trust.127 
A court might rely on “common understanding of human nature and an
average experience with it”128 in interpreting the word “issue” in a trust.
One court stated: 
A normal mother would rarely be reconciled—much less desire—that her
son through the adoption of a child stranger to her blood and possessing a living
natural father should thereby effect a diversion from her own daughter and
foreseeably from her own sister of one-half of this trust income upon the son’s 
death and preclude her blood kin from any derivative participation in one-half of
the trust corpus.129 
Several statutes drew a distinction between a trust or deed that provided
for “issue” rather than “bodily issue,” or “heirs” rather than “bodily heirs.”
For example, a 1941 Wisconsin statute130 defined “issue” as including adoptees
as descendants of the ancestor, but specifically excluded adoptees from 
“heirs of the body” until the law was changed in 1945.131  Missouri law 
provided that the adopted child became the child of its adopting parents 
for every purpose, with one exception: when the inheritance was limited 
to “heirs of the body” of such child or parents by adoption.132  Ohio law
was the same.133  Courts in Iowa, Mississippi, Oklahoma, West Virginia, 
and Washington made similar distinctions.  Although a 1981 Iowa case,
Elliott v. Hiddleson,134 had abolished the stranger to the adoption rule absent
contrary intent, a 1935 deed specifying that the remainder should go to “the
heirs of the granddaughter’s body” was sufficient to show such contrary
124. Whitfield, 334 So. 2d at 877. 
125.  Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 501 (W. Va. 1977). 
126.  Reedy v. Propst, 288 S.E.2d 526, 530 (W. Va. 1982). 
127. Ortega v. First Republicbank Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. 1990)
(citing Martin v. Neel, 379 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)). 
128.  Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 400 (Me. 1963). 
129. Id.
 130. WIS. STAT. § 322.07 (1941) (amended 1945). 
131.  Smith v. Reinhart (In re Trusts of Adler), 140 N.W.2d 119, 223 (Wis. 1966). 
132. MO. REV. STAT. § 1101 (1917) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 453.110 
(2019); St. Louis Union Tr. Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Mo. 1934). 
133. See OHIO GEN. CODE § 8030 (1921) (current version at OHIO REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 3107.15 (West 2019)); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio 1986)). 
134.  303 N.W.2d 140, 144–45 (Iowa 1981). 
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intent, and adoptees were not included.135  The Supreme Court of Mississippi 
found the phrase “heirs of the body” to be unambiguous: “It is quite plain 
that heirs of the body literally excludes adopted children,” and thus an 
adopted child was not a remainder person in a 1950 will.136  Oklahoma
adopted the Uniform Adoption Act in 1957,137 which provided that from
the date of the adoption decree, the adopted child inherits from and 
through the adoptive parent, but still the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held 
that a testamentary trust with a remainder to the issue of his daughter’s 
body excluded an adopted child.138  In West Virginia, in a will executed 
in 1967, real property vested in the testator’s daughter “upon the condition 
that a child or children are born of her body;” the court found this language 
“clear and unambiguous” to “indicate an element of biological origin absent 
from the more general terms ‘issue,’ ‘descendants,’ ‘child,’ ‘heirs,’ or ‘natural 
children.’”139  A comment in the 1940 Restatement of Property was in accord 
with this view: 
Adopted child as a claimant.  An adopted child of the designated ancestor is not 
an heir of his body.  Thus, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is found from 
additional language or circumstances, an adopted child is not included in a
limitation to the “heirs of the body” of a designated person.140 
Confusion continued after the common law presumption was reversed, 
and adoptees were included in class terms such as “grandchildren,” “issue” 
or “heirs” unless a contrary intent was found. The law was changing rapidly.
In 1936, only a handful of states allowed adoptees to inherit through the 
adopter: California141 and Hawaii142 by case law, Minnesota by statute,143 
135.  Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1983). 
136.  Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 835 (Miss. 1988). 
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16 (West 1996) (current version at OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 7505-6.5 (West 2019)); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 269 (Okla. 1967). 
138.  Moore, 428 P.2d at 271. 
139.  Reedy v. Propst, 288 S.E.2d 526, 530 (W. Va. 1982). 
140. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 306 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1940). 
141. In a will executed in 1903, decedent created a testamentary trust for her niece 
for life, then to her niece’s children.  Decedent died in 1905; her niece adopted three persons in 
1924 and died in 1954 survived by them.  Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. 
Reynolds (In re Estate of Stanford), 315 P.2d 681, 682 (Cal. 1957). 
142. An 1896 irrevocable deed of trust paid income to children for life, then to
the lawful issue of the children aforesaid then surviving.  In 1914, one of the trustor’s four 
children adopted an infant.  See generally O’Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939). 
143. Note, Legislation and Decisions on Inheritance Rights of Adopted Children, 22
IOWA L. REV. 145, 147 n.12 (1936).  The Note also lists Connecticut, but that is clearly in 
error, given cases such as Connecticut National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chadwick and Connecticut 
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thus including adoptees in class terms such as “children” or “issue.”  By
1959, that number had grown to twenty-three states that presumed that 
adoptees were included in such terms because they were able to inherit
from collateral relatives,144 and by 1962, there were as many as thirty-four
such jurisdictions.145  What was sufficient for a contrary intent to now
exclude an adoptee from a class term in these states?  A Minnesota court 
held that a settlor creating a life estate followed by a remainder in the issue 
of the life tenant’s body was not sufficient evidence to exclude adoptees.146 
An Illinois court found the opposite: a testator who made gifts over to the 
“lawful issue” of his children clearly intended to include adoptees by
eschewing the court’s “road map to anyone desiring to exclude adopted 
children from his will.”147  The court defined the class as the heirs of his
body, or to children of the blood of his children, or to children born to his 
children.148  Citing the 1940 Restatement of Property, the Iowa Supreme
Court agreed: a remainder in the “heirs of her body” manifested a blood 
relationship between the grantor and the holder of the estate, and thus 
indicated a contrary intent.149 
While most courts held that specifying that a child or heir must be born
to a particular person or after a specified date was contrary intent,150 that
was not enough to reverse the presumption for a Michigan court.  An 
irrevocable inter vivos trust that provided for each of the settlor’s grandchildren 
living on February 1, 1975, plus additional grandchildren born after 
February 1, 1975, was held to include adopted children born before 1975 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Coffin applying the common law rule well beyond 1936.  See 
generally Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 1991); Conn. 
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Coffin, 569 A.2d 531 (Conn. 1990). 
144. See Marylin Klosty, Note, Property Rights as Affected by Adoption, 25 BROOK.
L. REV. 231, 242–46 (1959). 
145.  Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50
IOWA L. REV. 971, 974 n.18 (1965) (citing SECOND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE 
COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION, AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF 
ESTATES 154–55 (1963)).  Another author asserts only twenty-six jurisdictions allowed 
adoptees to succeed from a collateral relative at this time.  Emilio S. Binavince, Adoption 
and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative Study and a Proposal for Model 
Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152, 174 n.97 (1966). 
146. See, e.g., In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 
167 (Minn. 1977) (“[I]ssue of her body . . . .”). 
147.  Chi. Title & Tr. Co. v. Vance, 529 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Ill. 1988). 
148. Id.
149. Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF PROP. § 306 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1940)). 
150. See, e.g., Ortega v. First Republicbank Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452, 456 
(Tex. 1990), aff’g sub nom Martin v. Neel, 379 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1964).  “The use of the 
words ‘great-grandchildren who may be born after my death’ renders it most improbable 
that he was referring to children born to strangers.”  Martin, 379 S.W.2d at 424. 
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but adopted thereafter.151  The terms “born” and “date of birth,” the court 
explained, “appear to us to be convenient ways of explaining the mechanics 
of the administration of the trust . . . [rather than] an intent to exclude 
adopted grandchildren.”152 Thus, while specifying that someone must be
an “heir of the body” or “born to” a particular person was once seen as 
sufficient intent to limit the class to those related by blood to the settlor or 
testator, once the presumption was reversed, these same terms were often 
seen in a very different light. 
IV. FOUR CONSEQUENCES IF WE FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE ADOPTION 
CASES FOR ART CHILDREN 
We are now at a point where trustees are beginning to ask courts for 
advice on whether ART children are included in class terminology. So
far, just two cases have been published on the issue.  The 2005 New York 
case, In re Doe,153 tackled the issue squarely.  The settlor had created an inter 
vivos trust for his daughter’s descendants that expressly provided that 
“adoptions shall not be recognized.”154 The daughter, K. Doe, had used 
a donor egg, her husband’s sperm, and a gestational carrier in California 
to become the parent of twins who were not biologically related to her or 
to the settlor.155  The trustee asked the court for instructions: are the twins
beneficiaries of the trust?156  The court concluded that they were, for two 
reasons.  First, the court found that the settlor’s “no adoption” language was 
not intended to exclude all those not related to him by blood, since he 
included spouses of certain relatives in the trust.157  Second, under California 
law, K. Doe and her husband had received a judgment of parental relationship; 
they had not formally adopted the twins.158  In the second case, decided 
the year before Doe, the Virginia Supreme Court ducked the issue.  Trustees 
of eleven inter vivos trusts created in 1929, 1930, and 1931 for the settlor’s 
descendants had petitioned the lower court to determine the beneficiaries; 
one beneficiary filed an answer asking the court to decide if those conceived 
through assisted reproduction were included in the class, along with those 
151. In re Maloney Trust, 377 N.W.2d 791, 792 n.4 (Mich. 1985). 
152.  Id. at 794. 
153.  793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005). 
154.  Id. at 879–80. 
155.  Id. 
156.  See id. 
157.  Id. at 880. 
158.  Id. at 881. 
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who were adopted.159  The Supreme Court defined the issue on appeal as
concerning only the adopted persons and did not consider ART children 
at all.160 
In the next decade, these questions from trustees and beneficiaries are
likely to become more frequent, and courts may not have the option of
avoiding them.  Will we go down the same path as courts did in the 1950s,
finely parsing the language, finding different results if a settlor uses “issue” 
rather than “descendants,” or guessing what the settlor’s intent might have 
been? Or will we adopt a better strategy to deal with these cases now,
before they become more common?  If we choose the first strategy and 
follow the reasoning of the adoption cases, as the New York court did in 
Doe, we face at least four unsettling consequences.
A. A Presumption that ART Children Must Be Genetically Related to the 
Settlor Will Lead to an Increase in Demands for Genetic 
Testing, Prompting Privacy Concerns 
Many states, in interpreting a will, trust, or deed executed decades ago, 
apply the law when the document was executed or became irrevocable and
thus employ the common law presumption that adoptees are not included
in class gifts.  Just since 2000 there have been cases in Indiana,161 Massachusetts,162 
Maine,163 and Virginia164 interpreting trusts created between 1907 and 1942
using the presumption.  As discussed earlier, courts assumed that the common 
law presumption embodied a preference for blood relatives, as did words 
such as “issue,” “descendants,” and the like.165 
If the issue is raised, then potential beneficiaries might insist on all class
members—not just ART children—submit to genetic testing.  If genetic testing 
is ordered, scholars have raised a number of privacy concerns. 
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing requires a person to submit a 
cheek swab or other tissue sample to a company, such as Ancestry.com or
159.  McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 100–01 (Va. 2004). 
160. Id. at 102. 
161. E.g., Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting “issue” 
in a 1942 testamentary trust). 
162. E.g., Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 26–27 (Mass. 2012)
(applying retroactively a 1958 law reversing the common law presumption violated substantive 
due process).
163. E.g., In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 216 (Me. 2017) (interpreting 
“issue” in a 1907 inter vivos trust). 
164. McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Va. 2004) (interpreting “direct lineal 
descendants” in a 1929 inter vivos trust). 
165. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
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23andMe.166  The resulting report allows the identification of the person’s
relatives in the vast genetic database, relatives who have not consented to 
having their identities revealed.167  In addition, some DTC genetic providers 
allow or encourage submission of a third-party’s samples.168  For example,
the DTC company Bio-Gene DNA advises, “If you choose to test someone 
without their knowledge, there are samples that provide a better opportunity 
for obtaining a usable genetic profile than others. Much of our testing is 
done using samples such as hair, fingernail clippings, ear wax swabs, 
a toothbrush, cigarette butts, and chewing gum.”169  DNA Solutions, another 
DTC company, similarly advises consumers on how to take a secret DNA 
test, with success rates given for each of the listed samples, such as nail 
clippings, nasal discharge, and a tooth brush.170  Billionaire Kirk Kerkorian 
reportedly used dental floss obtained from Hollywood producer Steve 
Bing’s trash to establish that Bing, not Kerkorian, was the father of a child 
borne by Kerkorian’s wife Lisa Bonder Kerkorian.171  Companies that claim 
to require consent before testing DNA may not, in fact, do so.172  A 2009 
article in which a reporter, Michael Reilly, sent his colleague’s DNA to three 
166. How Does AncestryDNA Work?, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/ 
dna/lp/how-does-ancestrydna-work [https://perma.cc/FA45-MCEQ]; How It Works, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/howitworks [https://perma.cc/HYR4-ANW3]. 
167. “Siblings share around half their DNA.  Half siblings share a quarter; and first 
cousins, on average, share 12.5%.”  Amy Dockser Marcus, DNA Testing Forces Wrenching 
Choices for Family Historians, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2019, at A1. 
168.  James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey
of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 64 (2018). 
169. Alternative/Non-Standard DNA Samples, JOURNEY GENETIC TESTING, https://
dna-paternity-testing.com/alternative-samples [https://perma.cc/F2AA-W5RH]. 
170. Secret Paternity Test, DNA SOLUTIONS, https://www.dnanow.com/secret-dna-
test.htm [https://perma.cc/T4QF-WK4V].
171. Harvey Day, Daughter of Casino Billionaire Kirk Kerkorian Whose Mother 
Faked a DNA Test Showing He Was Her Real Father in Messy Paternity Battle Will Get 
$8.5m From His Will, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3754264/Daughter-casino-billionaire-Kirk-Kerkorian-took-fake-DNA-test-hide-
fact-wasn-t-real-father-8-5million-will.html [https://perma.cc/LSP9-VG88]; Robert W.
Welkos, Billionaire Takes New Legal Tack Regarding Child, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007, 
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-aug-09-me-kerkorian9-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/QPV5-ZVTV].
172. See Michael Reilly & Peter Aldhous, Special Investigation: How My Genome 













   
 
 







   
          
 
 
      
    
  
   
 
  
      
   
    
companies found that the three DTC genetic testers did not check Reilly’s 
assertion that the DNA was his own.173 
Federal laws are no help on this front: the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)174 is concerned with employers
and health insurers discriminating by using these genetic tests,175 and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)176 defines
“covered entities”177 in a way that excludes a trust beneficiary.178  Many
state laws on surreptitious DNA testing are inadequate as well. Georgia
and New York, for example, have too narrow a definition of genetic testing 
for our purposes, covering only health-related testing.179  Colorado, like
Georgia, declares that “[g]enetic information is the unique property of the 
individual to whom the information pertains,” but then specifies that 
“[t]he intent of this section is to prevent information derived from genetic 
testing from being used to deny access to group disability insurance or 
180long-term care insurance coverage.”  Wisconsin bans employers, but not
others, from nonconsented genetic testing.181  Alaska’s statute has been
described as “probably the most comprehensive,”182 prohibiting a person
from collecting a DNA sample, performing a DNA analysis, retaining the 
sample, or disclosing the results, “unless the person has first obtained the 
informed and written consent of the person,”183 but then states that the
consent requirement does not apply to DNA samples collected or analyzed 
for the purpose of determining paternity.184  Unless one is in a state like
New Hampshire with a comprehensive ban on surreptitious genetic testing,185 
173. Id.
174.  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2012). 
175. Id. § 2000ff-1. 
176. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
177. “The HIPAA Privacy Rule . . . applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and those health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically.”  The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7T32-LX6M]; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018). 
178. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 168, at 40. 
179. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (LexisNexis 2019). 
180. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a), (d) (2019). 
181. WIS. STAT. § 111.372 (2019). 
182. Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic 
Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 687 (2011). 
183. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(1) (2019). 
184. Id. § 18.13.010(b)(3).  The Alaska statute could provide a remedy if the results 
are used in a way forbidden by Alaska law.  Id. § 18.13.010(a)(1).  For example, Michael 
Cole consented to a DNA test and to nine projects at Family Tree DNA but alleged he had 
not consented to having his full DNA test results publicly disclosed on another website;
he sued and survived a motion to dismiss. Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-00004-
SLG, 2019 WL 2571244, at *1 (D. Alaska June 21, 2019). 
185. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:1 to -H:6 (2018). 
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a trust beneficiary that suspected that her sibling or cousin was not 
biologically related to the settlor could send in her own cheek swab for 
comparison, plus a sample secretly obtained from her relative’s hairbrush 
or Q-tip. If her suspicions are confirmed, the beneficiary could then move
for a court order that the relative prove a biological connection to the
settlor.186 
Even those who have consented to DNA testing have reported the
disruptions that have ensued when they learned that their ancestry was
different from family lore. When a woman discovered through a DNA 
test that her father was not related biologically to his parents, “I really lost
all my identity . . . . I felt adrift.  I didn’t know who I was—you know, who I 
really was.”187  Another who discovered several half siblings on DNA websites 
reported being angry and confused; his half sibling said, each time she found 
a new relative, “You just relive this nightmare, every single time.”188  The
stakes go up considerably when the results of the DNA can exclude the 
person from the trust.  Some of the trusts in the case study have generous 
assets: one inter vivos trust was worth $2 million in 1966, or $15.5 million 
today;189 a testamentary trust had $4.6 million in principal in 1965,190 or 
$37,398,000 in 2019.191 
The incentives for beneficiaries to demand DNA testing, and the possibility
of surreptitious testing, raise serious privacy issues.  Some scholars have 
argued that anonymous donors have a privacy right in keeping their identity 
confidential, which can implicate the fundamental right to procreate.192 
186. Both DNA Solutions and Bio-Gene DNA estimate the success rate from hair 
samples at 80%; the Q-tip sample was estimated at 80% by DNA Solutions if two Q-tips 
are submitted, and 65% by Bio-Gene DNA.  Alternative/Non-Standard DNA Samples, supra 
note 169; Secret Paternity Test, supra note 170.  Bio-Gene DNA lists the success rate for 
a cheek swab as 99.99%.  Secret Paternity Test, supra note 170. 
187. Libby Copeland, She Thought She Was Irish—Until a DNA Test Opened a 100-
Year-Old Mystery, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2017, 4:13 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/environment/ct-dna-test-mystery-family-tree-20170729-story.html [https://perma.cc/
JD8P-35K7]. 
188. Zaveri, supra note 42. 
189. In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d 8, 9 n.2 (Pa. 1966). 
190. Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1967), overruled by 
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977). 
191. See Inflation Calculator, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.in2013
dollars.com/us/inflation/1965?endYear=2019&amount=4600000 [https://perma.cc/38GQ-
BXTP].
192. See, e.g., Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca Ireland, Anonymously Provided Sperm 
and the Constitution, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (2012); Abigail Hoglund-Shen, Direct-
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Because nonconsenting relatives can be traced through these DNA tests,193 
greater protections may be needed to protect those relatives.194  DTC sites 
have recently been used to identify more than a dozen suspects in murder 
and rape investigations, even though the suspects themselves had not placed 
their DNA on the websites.195  The suspected Golden State Killer, for
example, was identified by police uploading data from crime scene DNA 
to an online database, GEDMatch, with almost one million DNA profiles, 
and finding several matches that were the equivalent of third cousins.196 
Police then used other information, such as the physical description of the 
attacker, age, and location, to gather abandoned material from the suspect 
for further DNA analysis, to compare with the crime scene DNA sample.197 
One study estimates that “more than 30% of individuals in the forensic
databases can also be linked to a sibling, parent, or child in a consumer 
database.”198 
Few DNA companies or laws protect these interests. A 2017 survey of
DTC genetic test policies found that 71% of the companies—thirty-three of 
fifty-five—stated that the consumer’s genetic information could be used
internally by the company for purposes other than providing results to the 
consumer.199  Regarding ownership of the genetic material or the resulting
data, 73% of DTC companies had no express policy in 2017, while 18% 
to-Consumer Genetic Testing, Gamete Donation, and the Law, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 472, 476–77 
(2017).
193. This was true as early as 2004, when a person used a DTC genetic test and several
online search engines to find the anonymous sperm donor who was his father.  Alison 
Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 2, 2005), https:// 
www.newscientist.com/article/mg18825244-200-anonymous-sperm-donor-traced-on-
internet [https://perma.cc/2K9A-LGEF].
194. See, e.g., Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2015) 
(proposing that DNA identification and analysis be governed by a framework akin to tenancy 
by the entirety). 
195.  Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer
Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nab-golden-
state-killer-can-home-about-60-white [https://perma.cc/GTK2-Q2AV]; Colleen Shalby,
DNA Analysis Identifies Suspect in Series of Rapes from Early 1990s, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 
2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-dna-evidence-assault-
20190701-story.html [https://perma.cc/VP4W-5WVL]; Rachel Weiner, Alexandria Rape 




196. Kaiser, supra note 195.  These third cousins had submitted their profiles from
Ancestry.com or 23andMe to GEDMatch.com to search for relatives on the website. Id.
 197. Weiner, supra note 195. 
198. Kaiser, supra note 195. 
199. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 168, at 52. 
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said the company owned it, and 13% said it belonged to the consumer.200 
Only a handful of states have laws stating that the genetic information belongs
to the consumer.201 Thus, in most states, a person could surreptitiously 
analyze another’s DNA without consequence.  If courts interpret an old 
trust as requiring beneficiaries to be related by blood to the settlor, this 
could encourage beneficiaries to routinely ask for DNA testing. 
B. A Presumption that ART Children Must Be Genetically Related to 
the Settlor Will Have a Disparate Impact on Children of 
Same-Sex Couples, Potentially Leading to Stigma 
The Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law estimates that 4.5% of
the adult population of the United States identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transgender (LGBT)—about 11,343,000 people.202  Just like their heterosexual 
counterparts, many LGBT adults are in stable family relationships.  
A 2016–2017 study estimated that about 1.5% of young LGB people ages 
eighteen to twenty-five, 15% of those ages thirty-four to forty-one, and 
25% of those ages fifty-two to fifty-nine were married to a same-sex partner, 
while overall 47% of the youngest group to 87% of the oldest group were 
in a same-sex relationship.203  A Gallup poll from the same period found 
that 10.2% of LGBT Americans were married, and 61% overall were in a 
same-sex relationship.204 
While public support for same-sex marriage has grown, with 62% supporting
it in a 2017 Pew Research survey compared to 37% ten years earlier,205 
violence and stigma remain.206 Members of the LGBT community experience
200. Id. at 52–53. 
201. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-
54-1(1) (2018); 1997 La. Acts 1418.  Oregon’s statute says the information is “private and 
must be protected.” OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(1) (2018). 
202. Adult LGBT Population in the U.S., WILLIAMS INST., https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/research/lgbt-adults-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/5VXD-WCYC].
203. ILAN H. METER & EVAN A. KRUGER, WILLIAMS INST., LEGALLY MARRIED LGB 
PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Married-LGB-People-in-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM7S-C6VL].
204. David Masci, Anna Brown & Jocelyn Kiley, 5 Facts About Same-Sex Marriage, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 24, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/26/same-
sex-marriage [https://perma.cc/AF8D-SSKN].
205. Id.
 206. See Lisa Rapaport, Gay Fathers Face Stigma as Parents, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 
2019, 1:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-lgbt-gay-dads/gay-fathers-
face-stigma-as-parents-idUSKCN1P92TS [https://perma.cc/7E38-8DJP].
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proportionately more hate crimes, such as murder and assault, than members
of other minority groups.207  The 2017 FBI Hate Crime Report found that
16% of single-bias hate crimes were the result of sexual orientation bias.208 
Close to 10% of gay and lesbian persons, and 30% of those who are 
transgender, report that they have been refused health care because of their
identity.209  Federal health regulations, such as policies on HIV and bans on 
blood and organ donations, trade on stereotypes of gay men, contributing 
to stigma.210 
Heterosexual couples can easily conceal their use of donated gametes 
so long as they choose donors who physically resemble them.  Same-sex
couples do not have the choice of concealment: it is readily apparent that
a third person must have supplied a gamete, and thus a donor, whether 
anonymous or not,211 must have been involved. 
A same-sex spouse is in a different position to the outside world.  As 
Nancy Polikoff has observed, “[A] female spouse will always know that 
she is not the biological parent of her spouse’s child.”212  Those outside the 
same-sex couple will also know that one of the two spouses is not the biological 
parent of the child.  If courts read “no adoptees” to mean “genetic relationships 
only,” that creates a target for the children of same-sex couples, who have 
always been created with a third person’s gametes.  This could potentially 
lead to more stigma for these children since they will, once again, be different 
from their peers. 
207. Haeyoun Park & Iaryna Mykhyalyshyn, L.G.B.T. People Are More Likely To
Be Target of Hate Crimes than Any Other Minority Group, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-crimes-against-lgbt.html [https://
perma.cc/A3EB-99XW]. 
208. 2017 Hate Crime Statistics 2017, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-
crime/2017/topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses [https://perma.cc/4MLU-ABQP].
209. Dhruv Khullar, Stigma Against Gay People Can Be Deadly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/well/live/gay-lesbian-lgbt-health-stigma-
laws.html [https://perma.cc/M3MJ-SNHS].
210. Russell K. Robinson & David K. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 ARIZ.
L. REV. 213, 213–14 (2018). 
211. The “free sperm” movement allows donors and recipients to match via the internet
or other social media, and thus donors are not anonymous.  Susan Frelich Appleton, Between 
Binaries: Exploring the Legal Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. 
L.Q. 93, 110 (2015).  In some cases, the donor may have a role in the child’s life after the 
child’s birth.  See id.  In addition, a 2008–2010 General Social Survey found that “13% of 
women who identify as lesbian have had sex with a man in the last five years; 2% have 
had sex with a man in the last year.”  Nancy D. Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes . . . 
How Many? Using In re M.C. To Consider Parentage of a Child Conceived Through 
Sexual Intercourse and Born to a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015, 2017–18 (2012).  
These women might choose to become pregnant through sexual intercourse rather than via 
assisted insemination. 
 212. Polikoff, supra note 211, at 2026–27. 
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C. A Presumption that ART Children Must Be Genetically Related to the 
Settlor Will Cause Enormous Disruptions in Families, Pitting  
Siblings, Cousins, and Other Family Members 
Against Each Other 
Two data points indicate that interpreting “adoptions shall not be 
recognized” as requiring a blood relationship with the settlor will cause 
enormous family disruptions: an examination of how courts have dealt with 
the adoption cases, and the more recent litigation on ART cases.
The seventy-four adoption cases in my database often pitted adoptees
against their siblings, cousins, and other relatives.  In twelve of the seventy-
four cases (16%), the biological relatives were the initiating party with claims
in conflict with the adoptees.213  In the nine cases initiated by the adoptee, 
the natural relatives also actively opposed giving any interest to the adoptees 
by filing motions or appealing an adverse judgment.214  Over half of the
cases, forty out of seventy-four (54%), were initiated by a trustee, executor, 
or administrator filing a petition for instructions or for construction of the 
document, or seeking approval of an accounting, which would appear to 
be neutral.215  However, in three of these cases the trustees took a position 
either for or against including adoptees.216  In another nineteen cases initiated
213. See, e.g., Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925) (involving
natural grandson’s action for partition of real property versus adopted granddaughter, his 
cousin); Peele v. Finch, 200 S.E.2d 635, 635 (N.C. 1973) (granting life tenant’s natural sister 
summary judgment regarding real property; appealed by adopted child of life tenant’s 
deceased sister); In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (involving 
dispute that arose between natural child and adopted grandchildren concerning their rights 
as beneficiaries of inter vivos and testamentary trusts).  For all twelve cases, see Appendix A. 
214. See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 924 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (involving 
an adopted child’s filed action against natural sibling to be declared owner of half of real 
property conveyed by deed; both parties appealed); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 744 
(Tenn. 1988) (involving natural son of testator’s niece who claimed entire principal of trust 
against niece’s adopted grandchildren, his cousins; adoptive grandchildren filed action); 
Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 1985) (involving 
adopted child who brought successful claim to take under a will; natural children appealed; 
reversed; adopted child appealed; reversed).  For all nine cases, see Appendix B. 
215. For all forty cases, see Appendix C.  In the remaining thirteen cases, which can be
found in Appendix D, there was either no conflict, or it could not be ascertained who had initiated 
the court proceeding or whether the residuary beneficiaries were related to the settlor or 
testator. 
216. Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 277, 277–80 (Ind. 2001) (involving trustees, the 
settlor’s natural great-grandchildren, who petitioned for distribution of the trust and a ruling 
that an adopted great grandchild was not a beneficiary; adoptee appealed); Makoff v. Makoff, 
528 P.2d 797, 797–99 (Utah 1974) (involving trustees who sued for construction; trustees 
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by a trustee, executor, or administrator, the natural relatives played an
active role in opposing the adoptees’ claims.217  Rarely did the adopted
person’s claim impact only nonrelatives.218  Instead, allowing an adopted 
grandchild or niece to have an interest diminished some or all of a natural 
relatives’ share in all but two of the cases. 
Thus, we find cases in which siblings sued their sisters and brothers,219 
uncles and aunts opposed their nieces and nephews,220 and cousins battled 
cousins.221  Some cases dragged on for years and involved multiple appeals.
In one case involving trusts created in 1927, a construction suit was settled 
and adoptee nephew appealed from granting of motion for summary judgment filed by
natural children, and denial of motion for summary judgment filed by trustees and adoptee); 
Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1967) (involving trustee 
who petitioned for construction of will; trustee and natural nieces and nephews of testator 
alleged that testator’s adopted grandchild could not take as “issue”), overruled by Wheeling
Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977). 
217. See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1198 n.4
(Conn. 1991) (involving trustee who filed declaratory judgment action to determine if 
adopted grandchildren were beneficiaries of trust; natural grandchildren opposed including 
grandchildren adopted after execution of will); In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562, 
564, 568 (Iowa 1985) (involving trustee who filed declaratory action to resolve whether 
adopted granddaughter was “issue;” her uncle, testator’s son who would receive all instead 
of half to adoptee, testified that testator intended to distinguish between adopted and 
natural children); Alley v. Strickland, 302 S.E.2d 866, 866 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam) (involving 
biological children and grandchildren who appealed construction of will that included adopted 
grandchild). For a complete list, see Appendix A & C. 
218.  Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816, 816 
(Mich. 1967) (involving adopted son who sued to be deemed only “issue” of testator’s niece; if 
no issue, gift over to Salvation Army); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 
614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923) (involving adopted grandchild who sued to construe will, with gift 
over to university if adoptee was deemed to have no interest). 
219. See, e.g., Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 21 (Mass. 2012) 
(involving natural child who sought declaratory judgment against trustees and two adopted 
brothers); Allen v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per curiam) (involving a declaratory 
judgment for construction of a deed filed by natural children versus their adopted sister, 
originally their first cousin); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 771–72 (S.C. Ct. 
App.1985) (involving a life tenant and his adopted son who filed suit against life tenant’s 
brothers and sisters and their issue for an order for the sale of real property bequeathed to 
life tenant and his surviving children). 
220. Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 333–34 (Iowa 1983) (involving adopted
granddaughter who filed action to interpret deed against her aunt and uncle; adoptee appealed); 
Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 833 (Miss. 1988) (involving natural children who filed 
petition to partition land; opposed adopted niece as beneficiary of remainder interest); 
Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 54–55 (N.J. 1925) (involving uncle who filed action in ejectment 
against adopted nephew); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 878–79 (Ohio 1986) (involving 
adopted grandchildren who filed motion to terminate trust against trustee/natural uncle). 
221. Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 544–46 (Mo. 1942) (involving adopted nephew’s 
child who filed petition to construe testator’s will against trustee and testator’s natural nephew; 
trustee and nephew demurred; adoptee appealed); In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. 
393, 395 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (involving adopted grandchildren who petitioned to determine 
their rights under testator’s will and codicil against natural sons and grandchildren). 
334
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and a decree entered in 1962, but the beneficiaries found themselves back
in court on a similar issue in 1976.222 In 1994, the trustees of George Parsons’ 
1907 trust asked a probate court for instructions on whether adopted 
children were included as beneficiaries; twenty years later, a beneficiary 
asked for a declaratory judgment on the same issue.223  The wills executed 
in 1938 by a husband and wife in Michigan resulted in litigation that went 
to the Michigan Court of Appeals, then, after receiving leave to appeal, to 
the Supreme Court of Michigan, with rehearing denied, and a writ of certiorari 
to the U.S. Supreme Court also denied.224  In another case, the court noted,
“This is the second time this will has been construed, and it will not be the 
last.”225  Some of the cases were battles over how many beneficiaries would 
share the proceeds, but in almost a third—twenty-four out of seventy-four— 
the suit was for the entire property, raising the stakes considerably.226 In 
these twenty-four cases, the trust or deed stated that the interest would go 
to the beneficiary’s “children” or “issue” or “heirs of his body,” but the 
beneficiary was survived only by the child she had adopted.227 
222.  Sennot v. Collet-Oser, 344 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
223. In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 217 (Me. 2017). 
224. Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 1985),
reh’g denied, 424 Mich. 1205 (1986), cert. denied, Papalini v. Fithian, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986); 
Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 419 Mich. 933 (1984). 
225. Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 235–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (footnote omitted)
(citing Green v. Lewis, 151 So. 270 (Fla. 1933), aff’d, 153 So. 901 (1934) (mem.)). 
226. For cases involving litigation of the entire property, see generally Bank of Am. 
v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons (In re Estate of Heard), 319 
P.2d 637 (Cal. 1957); Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899 (Conn. 1972); Casper 
v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925); In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562
(Iowa 1985); Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1983); Ziehl v. Maine Nat’l Bank, 
383 A.2d 1364 (Me. 1978); Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 
N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1967); Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313 (Miss. 1948); Kindred v. 
Anderson, 209 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. 1948); Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544; Melek v. Curators of 
Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54 (N.J. 
1925); Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1965);
In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652 (N.Y. 1910); Allen v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. 1963) (per 
curiam); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1967); Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797 
(Pa. 1972); In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601 (Pa. 1918); Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 
498 (S.C. 1973); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Calhoun v. 
Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. 1988); Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1906); Trueax v. Black, 335 P.2d 52 (Wash. 1959); Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 115 (W. Va. 1967), overruled by Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. 
v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977). 
227. See, e.g., Ahlemeyer, 131 A. at 54; Moore, 428 P.2d at 268; Cochran, 95 S.W. 
at 731. 
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Over and over, we see family members willing to sue each other over 
whether to exclude adopted children.  The most recent litigation on ART 
children and their inclusion in dynasty trusts, In re Doe,228 follows this
same pattern, with a similar analysis by the court.  Just as in the adoption 
cases, the New York court in Doe tried to glean the settlor’s intent when 
he stated that “adoptions shall not be recognized.”229  Did he mean to exclude 
his daughter’s child created with an anonymously donated egg and carried 
by a gestational surrogate?  Here, though, the question of the settlor’s intent 
is arguably quite different than in the typical adoption case.  While adoptions 
had been carried out for decades before these trusts were established, and 
thus settlors were presumed to be aware that a beneficiary might adopt a 
child in the future, no such assumption can be made about our settlors 
regarding ART in the vast majority of these trusts.  Only six of the seventy- 
four instruments were created in 1960 or later; the writer would have to 
have been quite knowledgeable about assisted insemination to be aware 
that the technique was being offered in the late 1950s.230  And of course,
only one of these wills, trusts, or deeds was created at a time when any other 
method of ART was available: the latest one was created when the testator 
died in 1979,231 while Louise Brown, the first in vitro fertilization baby, was
born in England in 1978,232 and another five years elapsed before a baby 
was born using a donated egg.233  While the settlors or testators of
these old instruments may have had an opinion as to whether adopted 
children should be beneficiaries, they certainly did not have one regarding ART 
children because, in the vast majority of cases, the techniques simply did 
not exist.  As the court found in Doe, “The reproductive technologies
involved in this case—in vitro fertilization and gestational surrogacy—were 
established in the 1970s, well after these trusts were settled.  It is unlikely that 
the settlor’s views of these methods of reproduction can be discovered.”234 
The court in Doe then examined whether the settlor intended to exclude 
all nonblood relations, and concluded that he did not, because he
228. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005). 
229. Id. at 879. 
230. See Wendy Kramer, A Brief History of Donor Conception, HUFFPOST, https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/a-brief-history-of-donor-conception_b_9814184 [https://perma.cc/ 
JBX2-E37D] (last updated Dec. 6, 2017). 
231. Pate v. Ford, 360 S.E.2d 145, 148–49 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d, 376 S.E.2d
775 (S.C. 1989).
232. Sanders, supra note 27. 
233. Third-Party Reproduction: Sperm, Egg, and Embryo Donation and Surrogacy, 
AM.SOC’Y FOR REPROD.MED., https://www.reproductivefacts.org/news-and-publications/patient-
fact-sheets-and-booklets/documents/fact-sheets-and-info-booklets/third-party-reproduction- 
sperm-egg-and-embryo-donation-and-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/FT5E-TYJS]. 
234. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 880. 
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provided for the spouses of some beneficiaries.235  In a second line of
analysis, the court noted that K. Doe’s children were not adopted; under 
California law, they received a judgment of parental relationship under an 
entirely different section of the California Family Code, even though 
K. Doe was not genetically related to the twins.236 
In Doe, we have a court parsing the language in much the same way as 
in the adoption cases: What specific words did the settlor use?  What did 
the settlor intend? While these are admirable goals, they threaten to put 
us in the same confrontational loop with ART children as with adopted
children, with little to gain. 
D. A Presumption that ART Children Must Be Related to the Settlor 
Will Result in More Litigation than a Simpler, Better Solution 
The adoption cases require the language of each individual trust, will,
or deed to be examined, and the intent of each settlor to be queried, in order 
to determine if adopted beneficiaries are in or out.  If courts adopt a similar 
approach to ART children, we can expect the same result as in the adoption 
cases: years of litigation, family members suing each other, and relatives 
finding to their surprise that their biological origins are not what they had 
assumed. 
Are there better solutions?  One suggestion has been the relatively new
process of decanting, in which the contents of the old trust are “decanted” 
into a new trust with some new terms.237  Decanting can be seen as “a form
of trust modification initiated by the trustee,”238 or as analogous to “a
nongeneral power of appointment.”239  New York was the first state to enact 
a statute authorizing trustees to decant, in 1992.240  Today, over half the
235. Id. 880–81. 
236. Id. at 881. 
237. Melissa J. Willms, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 EST.
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 35, 36–37 (2013). 
238. Id.
239. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Decanting: A Critical Perspective, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
1993, 2001 (2017). 
240. See 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520 (codified as amended at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS 
LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2019)); David Restrepo, New York’s Decanting Statute: Helping 
an Old Vintage Come to Life or Spoiling the Settlor’s Fine Wine?, 34 PACE L. REV. 479, 480 
(2014). 
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states have decanting statutes.241  While decanting can have many uses,
especially in modifying a trust to allow tax benefits, there is one thing 
decanting cannot do: “No decanting statute permits a trustee to add an 
entirely new beneficiary.”242  And that, it can be argued, is precisely what
we are trying to do here.  We are not dealing with trusts that give the trustee 
unlimited discretion to invade the principal, or even limited discretion to 
invade.  In fifteen of the seventy-four cases, the task was simply to distribute 
the remainder in the deed or will by construing a class term; in another 
forty-five cases, the trustee was divvying up the principal of the inter vivos 
or testamentary trust.243  No discretion was involved in any of these sixty 
241. Stephanie Vara, Two Cheers for Decanting: A Partial Defense of Decanting Statutes
as a Tool for Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 32 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 23, 24–25 
(2018).
242. Id. at 32 & n.28. 
243. For cases that construe a class term, see Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 925 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2003); Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925); Skoog v. 
Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 333 (Iowa 1983); Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 630 (Iowa 
1930); In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821, 821 (Me. 1907); Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 833 
(Miss. 1988); Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313, 315 (Miss. 1948); Graves v. Graves, 163 
S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. 1942); Peele v. Finch, 200 S.E.2d 635, 635 (N.C. 1973); Allen v. 
Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per curiam); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 
883 (Ohio 1986); Alley v. Strickland, 302 S.E.2d 866, 866 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam); Turner v. 
Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 499 (S.C. 1973); Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 771 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1985); Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Trueax 
v. Black, 335 P.2d 52, 52–53 (Wash. 1959).  For cases divvying up the principle, see
Zimmerman v. First Nat’l Bank, 348 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Ala. 1977); Peck v. Green, 96 
So. 2d 169, 169 (Ala. 1956); Bilsky v. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d 901, 901–02 (Ark. 1970); Bank 
of Am. v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons (In re Estate of 
Heard), 319 P.2d 637, 639–40 (Cal. 1957); In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948); 
Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Conn. 1991); Conn. Bank 
& Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 900 (Conn. 1972); Parker v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 
852 (Conn. 1969); Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); 
Nunnally v. Tr. Co. Bank, 252 S.E.2d 468, 468 (Ga. 1979), aff’d, 261 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 
1979); First Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ill. 1995); Sennot v. Collet-Oser, 
344 N.E.2d 783, 784–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2001); In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 1985); In re George
Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 217 (Me. 2017); Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8, 8 (Me. 
1985); Ziehl v. Maine Nat’l Bank, 383 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1978); Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. 
Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 397–98 (Me. 1963); Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 
378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 1985); Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of 
Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816, 817 (Mich. 1967); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 
S.W. 614, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Trust of 
Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 886 (Mont. 1958); Amoskeag Tr. Co. v. Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 161 
(N.H. 1966); In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 394 (N.J. 1969); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 
102, 103 (N.J. Ch. 1932); Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 
33, 36–37 (App. Div. 1965); In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 652 (N.Y. 1910); Bradford v. 
Johnson, 75 S.E.2d 632, 632 (N.C. 1953); Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206, 
1207 (Ohio 1986); Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 267–68 (Okla. 1967); Estate of
Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 798 (Pa. 1972); In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d 8, 9 (Pa. 1966); In 
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cases.  Only ten cases involved interpretation of an income interest, but
again, the trustee had no discretion as to the income244 or the principal.245 
The key precondition for decanting, discretion by the trustee,246 is missing
in these old trusts and wills. 
Decanting can also be used to give an existing beneficiary a new power
of appointment. In that case, “a trustee can decant to allow a beneficiary
to distribute trust property to a non-beneficiary or an individual who is not 
re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353, 355 (Pa. 1966); In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d 
883, 885 (Pa. 1960); In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601, 601 (Pa. 1918); Bowles v. 
Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 812 (S.C. 1995); Pate v. Ford, 360 S.E.2d 145, 149 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1987), rev’d, 376 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1989); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 
745–56 (Tenn. 1988); Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 514–15 (Tex. 1961); Penland v. 
Agnich, 940 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. App. 1997); In re Smith’s Will, 112 A. 897, 897 (Vt.
1921); Langhorne v. Langhorne, 186 S.E.2d 50, 51 (Va. 1972); Wheeling Dollar Sav. & 
Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 501 (W. Va. 1977); Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 
153 S.E.2d 114, 115–16 (W. Va. 1967), overruled by Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v.
Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977); Young v. First Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell),
184 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. 1971). 
244. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 876, 877 (Ala. 1976) (discussing a 
trust “for the benefit of the children now or later born to my son” provided that the trustee 
pay “the income” to the beneficiaries); Lewis, 389 So. 2d at 241 (providing the text of the 
will stating that on the death of a named beneficiary, “I then direct that the proportion of 
the income of such deceased person or persons, be divided among the issue of such 
deceased person”); King, 651 N.E.2d at 128 (providing after the first life tenant’s death, 
pay “the net income” to the lawful descendants of the settlor’s son and his wife); In re 
George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d at 216 (“[On an income beneficiary’s death, her] 
share of the Trust income was to be paid to her surviving ‘issue’ upon her death”); Bird 
Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 21, 24 (Mass. 2012) (discussing trust 
provided that “the income” was to be paid to three named beneficiaries, and on their 
deaths, to their issue); In re Maloney Trust, 377 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Mich. 1985) (separating 
income into “equal funds for each of the settlor’s grandchildren”); Wachovia Bank & Tr. 
Co. v. Andrews, 142 S.E.2d 182, 183 (N.C. 1965) (“After paying the expense of handling 
the trust, [the trustees] shall divide the annual income into twenty equal parts [and paid as 
follows] . . .”); Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974) (“The entire net income . . . 
shall be divided each year into equal shares as follows: One share for the then living issue 
of each of the following named sons of the Settlor . . .”); In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d 
1033, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (providing that in case of the death of one of the named 
children, the Trustees shall hold the property for the use of his or her issue and pay “the 
income” to them). 
245. See, e.g., Bird Anderson, 974 N.E.2d at 25 (“[On termination of the trust,] the 
principal is to be paid to the then income beneficiaries in the same proportions as they are 
entitled to receive income distributions.”); In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d at 1033–34 
(“Upon the death of the last of the three named beneficiaries, [children,] then the corpus 
of the trust shall be delivered and paid to the then surviving issue [grandchildren], including 
lineal descendants, of the three beneficiaries, per stirpes”). 
246. Willms, supra 237, at 39. 
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a permissible appointee.”247  The Uniform Trust Decanting Act, for example,
allows the trustee to create a power of appointment in a remainder beneficiary 
of the first trust so long as the power takes effect after the power holder is 
a current beneficiary.248  But as we have seen time and time again, the
remainder beneficiaries—the natural issue—do not want these others to 
take a share, or in some cases, the entire remainder.  Why in the world would 
they exercise the power in their favor? 
A third possible way to use decanting overlaps with modification. 
A trustee can decant to add a definitional phrase of what the settlor meant by 
the term “issue” or “grandchildren.”  That, too, raises a number of hurdles. 
First, the trustee must know what the settlor’s intent was, and it is highly 
unlikely the settlor decades ago had any thoughts on ART children.  The
trustee also must be willing to commit to a position on the settlor’s intent. 
Even on the more transparent issue of intent regarding adopted children,
recall that of our seventy-four cases, the trustees or executors took a 
position on whether adoptees were included or excluded in a class term in
only three of them.249  The duty of loyalty may be an obstacle as well.  The
Restatement of Trusts requires a trustee to deal with beneficiaries 
“impartially,”250 but how exactly does one do that when choosing whether
“grandchildren” is composed of solely the natural issue or also includes 
those who have been adopted or conceived via ART?  This means that 
decanting, like modification or even a motion to construe the trust, will all 
lead to the same result: extended litigation over what the settlor “meant” by 
the trust’s terms when applied to ART children.
A better solution has been applied in the few states that interpret this 
problem as a rule of construction, and thus apply the law as of the time 
the class is formed.  After all, those creating trusts and wills use class terms
such as “grandchildren” or “descendants” in order to allow members to
join and leave the group over time.  In the adoption cases, the chief objection 
to allowing adoptees to take is that, in effect, this creates a virtual power of 
appointment in a parent.251  Courts were especially troubled when the sole
motivation for adoption was to create an interest in someone else’s property.  
When the beneficiary of a 1932 testamentary trust adopted his wife the
court called this “an act of subterfuge which in effect thwarts the intent of 
the ancestor whose property is being distributed and cheats the rightful 
247. Vara, supra note 241, at 51. 
248. UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT § 11(d)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
249. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
251. See, e.g., In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y. 1910); Woods v. Crump, 142
S.W.2d 680, 684 (Ky. 1940); Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 615 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1923). 
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heirs.”252  An Illinois court quoted Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co. in terming a beneficiary’s adoption of his roommate “an act of subterfuge,” 
and stated, “If there had been no trust, there would undoubtedly have been 
no adoption.”253 
ART children are unlikely to raise these same concerns.  The child will 
come into the family as a minor and be raised as part of the family.  Unlike 
cases such as Minary, in which the beneficiary adopted his wife, there is
a true parent-child relationship between ART children and those raising
them. And it seems highly unlikely that one will say, as a parallel to the 
court in Cross v. Cross, “If there had been no trust, there would undoubtedly 
have been no [ART],”254 especially in the case of in vitro fertilization, in 
which a couple may have spent tens of thousands of dollars and many months 
enduring medical procedures in order to conceive. ART children would 
ordinarily meet the loco parentis test proposed by Professor Edward Halbach, 
in which he would include those “who were adopted at a relatively early 
age and reared by the adoptive parents.”255  Courts in California256 and Iowa257 
have cited Halbach in determining whether adoptees were intended to be 
part of a class. 
The courts using the third approach,258 in which the word “issue”
or “grandchildren” is seen as ambiguous and thus subject to rules of 
construction, have an even greater reason to find that the creator’s intent 
is not clear in the case of ART children.  The settlor or testator of these old 
trusts and wills had no thought at all on children created in lab test tubes 
or using frozen sperm. As with adopted children, the starting point should 
be that ART children are included in these class terms, absent express 
language excluding them from the trust, will, or deed.  Class terms such as 
“issue” or “grandchildren” should include those family members who are 
regarded as such, without requiring DNA tests to prove that they belong 
there. 
252.  Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr. Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341–43 (Ky. 1967). 
253.  Cross v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
254. Id.
255.  Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50
IOWA L. REV. 971, 990 (1965). 
256. In re Estate of Pittman, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 529 (Ct. App. 1980) (involving a 
1914 will that was executed before adult adoptions were legal in California). 
257. Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140, 144–45 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting stranger 
to the adoption presumption in Iowa). 
258. See supra Part III.
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V. CONCLUSION
Each year, thousands of children are conceived using assisted insemination, 
in vitro fertilization, gestational surrogates, and other forms of assisted
reproduction. In many cases, the parents of these children have turned to 
ART because of infertility issues, or because they are not a heterosexual
couple, and thus their children are not genetically related to one or both 
of them.  In some cases, as in In re Doe259 and McGehee v. Edwards,260 
these children are potential beneficiaries of a trust created decades before, 
at a time when a majority of states applied the common law presumption
that a settlor or testator preferred that only blood relatives benefit, and thus
adoptions shall not be recognized. Today, the Uniform Probate Code,261 
Restatement Third of Property,262 and most states, either by statute or case 
law,263 have abolished the stranger to the adoption presumption, at least 
for those adopted as minors, and thus assume that adoptees are included 
in class terms even though they are not related by blood to the testator or settlor.  
The same starting point should prevail for ART children.  My roadmap of 
seventy-four adoption cases, illustrating the family disruptions, invasions 
of privacy, stigma to same-sex families, and lengthy litigation likely to 
follow if we insist that a settlor way back in 1930 meant to exclude children 
until proven otherwise, all point to this much better solution. 
259. In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2005). 
260.  McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Va. 2004). 
261. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 14.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
263. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 62, at 111. 
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VI. APPENDIX A: SUIT FILED BY NATURAL RELATIVES
AGAINST ADOPTEES 
Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 54–55 (N.J. 1925) (uncle filed action in 
ejectment against adopted nephew). 
Allen v. Allen, 132 S.E.2d 909, 909 (N.C. 1963) (per curiam) (declaratory
judgment for construction of a deed filed by natural children against their 
adopted sister, originally their first cousin).
Bird Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 974 N.E.2d 21, 21 (Mass. 2012) 
(natural child sought declaratory judgment against trustees and two adopted 
brothers).
Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925) (natural grandson’s 
action for partition of real property against adopted granddaughter, his
cousin).
Kindred v. Anderson, 209 S.W.2d 912, 912, 914 (Mo. 1948) (nephew and
natural relative sued alleging adoptee could not take as “issue;” will
devised property to testator’s son but if he died without issue, to testator’s
other children; son died survived by his adopted daughter).
Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 235–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (natural 
granddaughter and her descendants sued adopted great-grandchildren, 
other grandchildren, and trustee for declaration as to parties’ rights to income 
and corpus; adoptees appealed).
In re George Parsons 1907 Trust, 170 A.3d 215, 217 (Me. 2017) (natural
child filed complaint requesting declaratory judgment that adoptee was 
not a beneficiary of inter vivos trust; natural child is probably uncle of
adopted child but may be cousin).
Peck v. Green, 96 So.2d 169, 169, 172 (Ala. 1956) (natural children filed 
bill in equity seeking division of principal of testamentary trust; appealed
by adopted child, their sister).
Peele v. Finch, 200 S.E.2d 635, 635 (N.C. 1973) (life tenant’s natural sister 
granted summary judgment regarding real property; appealed by adopted
child of life tenant’s deceased sister).
Posey v. Webb, 528 So. 2d 833, 833 (Miss. 1988) (will gave life estate to
daughter and the heirs of her body, otherwise to testator’s son; daughter died
survived by three natural children and one adopted son; natural children
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filed petition to partition land, and they opposed adopted sister as beneficiary 
of remainder interest). 
In re Trusts of Sollid, 647 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (dispute 
arose between natural child and adopted grandchildren concerning their
rights as beneficiaries of inter vivos and testamentary trusts; both inter 
vivos and testamentary trusts provided income for three children for life 
and on each child’s death, her share of income to that child’s issue; if child 
dies with no issue, then income paid to surviving children.  On death of 
last child, pay corpus to surviving issue [grandchildren] including lineal
descendants. One child died leaving three adopted stepchildren only).
Trueax v. Black, 335 P.2d 52, 52 (Wash. 1959) (testator’s natural children,
two grandchildren, and adopted grandchild had contesting claims for
ownership of farmland in decedent’s will; will gave farmland to daughter
for life, then to her children; if none, to testator’s other children and two 
named grandchildren. Daughter adopted her niece, testator’s grandchild 
not named in will, and died survived only by adoptee). 
344
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VII. APPENDIX B: SUIT FILED BY ADOPTEES AGAINST NATURAL 
RELATIVES 
Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 771–72 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (life 
tenant and his adopted son filed suit against life tenant’s brothers and 
sisters and their issue for an order for the sale of real property bequeathed 
to life tenant and his surviving children). 
Brown v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 924, 924 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (adopted
child filed action against natural sibling to be declared owner of half of 
real property conveyed by deed; both parties appealed de novo review of
decision to exclude adopted child).
Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 744 (Tenn. 1988) (natural son of 
testator’s niece claimed entire principal of trust against children of niece’s
adopted grandson, his cousins; grandchildren filed action).
Cutrer v. Cutrer, 345 S.W.2d 513, 513 (Tex. 1961) (mother sued on behalf 
of adopted son that he be declared heir of the body of her husband’s trust,
which otherwise would go to husband’s sister and mother). 
Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 544, 546 (Mo. 1942) (adopted nephew’s 
child filed petition to construe testator’s will against trustee and testator’s 
natural nephew; trustee and nephew, the adoptee’s uncle, demurred; adoptee 
appealed). 
Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 
1985) (daughter’s adopted child brought successful claim to take under a 
testamentary trust; natural children of other daughter appealed; reversed; 
adopted child appealed; reversed.  Testamentary trust for daughter for life, 
then to her issue; otherwise to other daughter.  Daughter survived by adopted 
child). 
Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 334–35 (Iowa 1983) (adopted great-
granddaughter filed action to interpret deed against her aunt and uncle; 
adoptee appealed. Deed gave granddaughter a life estate, then to heirs of
her body; court held that adopted great-granddaughter was not heir of her 
body).
Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878, 878 (Ohio 1986) (adopted grandchildren 
filed motion to terminate trust against trustee/natural uncle). 
 345




In re Estate of Underwood, 56 Va. Cir. 393, 395 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (adopted 
grandchildren petitioned to determine their rights under testator’s will and 
codicil against natural sons and grandchildren). 
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VIII. APPENDIX C: SUIT FILED BY TRUSTEE, EXECUTOR,
ADMINISTRATOR, OR OTHER FIDUCIARY 
Bold = litigation by natural relatives against adoptee. 
Alley v. Strickland, 302 S.E.2d 866, 866 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam) (biological
children and grandchildren appealed construction of will that included
adopted grandchild).
Amoskeag Tr. Co. v. Preston, 222 A.2d 158, 161 (N.H. 1966) (trustees brought 
action to construe “issue” in trust; settlor’s daughter adopted a child). 
Bilsky v. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d 901, 901–03 (Ark. 1970) (trustee filed petition
for construction of “issue” in trust; natural son appealed against his adopted 
niece).
Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (executor sued
for construction of will “if son dies without issue, then to two of testator’s 
grandchildren;” grandchildren appealed against son’s wife).
Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 900 (Conn. 1972) 
(action by trustee for construction of whether “child” or “children” in an inter 
vivos trust included an adopted child; appealed by adopted grandchild).
Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chadwick, 585 A.2d 1189, 1198 n.4 (Conn. 
1991) (trustee filed declaratory judgment action to determine if adopted 
grandchildren were beneficiaries of trust; natural grandchildren opposed
including grandchildren adopted after execution of will).
Conn. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Coffin, 569 A.2d 531, 531 (Conn. 1990) (trustee 
brought action to determine if adopted grandchildren were “issue” and thus
beneficiaries of trust; included adopted-out granddaughter but excluded
adopted-in grandchildren).
Dulfon v. Keasbey, 162 A. 102, 105 (N.J. Ch. 1932) (executor sued for
construction of testamentary trust with income to testator’s wife and three
sons; if a son died during wife’s life leaving lawful issue, to that son’s 
children. Held “children” does not include son’s adopted child).
Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313, 314–15 (Miss. 1948) (suit probably
initiated by executor, possibly Everett, for construction of will.  Held life 
estates to son and daughter, then to their children, but if died without issue, 
to other sibling. Appeal by son and his children against his sister’s adopted
children).
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Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Silsbee, 187 A.2d 396, 396 (Me. 1963) (action for 
construction of testamentary trust for her children and their “issue.”  Held 
adopted grandson was not issue.). 
First Nat’l Bank v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127, 127 (Ill. 1995) (trustee filed
action for declaratory judgment as to whether adopted child was a “lawful 
descendant” entitled to receive income and corpus along with natural child; 
natural child appealed). 
In re Trust of Fownes, 220 A.2d 8, 9 (Pa. 1966) (in an accounting action 
for an inter vivos trust, the court held the adopted son of settlor’s deceased 
grandson was not “issue” and thus not entitled to income).
Bank of Am. v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted
Masons (In re Estate of Heard), 319 P.2d 637, 637 (Cal. 1957) (trustee 
petitioned for instructions on how income from testamentary trust should
be distributed; cousin’s natural children appealed decision to include
adopted children).
In re Estate of Holton, 159 A.2d 883, 883 (Pa. 1959) (adopted grandchildren 
filed exceptions to an adjudication in the audit of an account of a testamentary
trust awarding natural grandchildren a portion of income and principal of 
a trust; adoptees appealed). 
In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y. 1910) (trustees filed accounting; adopted 
grandchild objected because trustees did not account to her or recognize 
her as beneficiary, but named testator’s nieces and nephews instead.
Testamentary trust for testator’s son for life, then to son’s surviving child). 
Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (trustees are natural 
great-grandchildren who petitioned for distribution of trust and a 
ruling that adopted great-grandchild was not a beneficiary; adoptee
appealed). 
Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 797 (Utah 1974) (trustees sued for construction;
trustees and adoptee nephew appealed from granting of motion for summary
judgment filed by natural children, and denial of motion for summary
judgment filed by trustees and adoptee).
In re Maloney Trust, 377 N.W.2d 791, 791 (Mich. 1985) (trustee petitioned
for instruction on whether “grandchildren born after” certain date included 
adopted grandchildren; adoptees appealed). 
McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99, 99–100 (Va. 2004) (trustees asked
court to determine if “direct lineal descendants” included out of wedlock 
children.  Natural descendant also asked court to decide if ART children
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were included.  Court held that those adopted by direct lineal descendants
were included; natural descendants appealed). 
Young v. First Wis. Tr. Co. (In re Will of Mitchell), 184 N.W. 2d 853,
854 (Wis. 1971) (trustee petitioned for construction of will; adopted great-
grandchildren appealed.  Testamentary trust provided for testator’s children
for life, then to each child’s surviving children; if such child leaves no
surviving child, to testator’s remaining children.  Testator’s grandson died
survived by two adopted daughters). 
Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 268 (Okla. 1967) (trustee filed an accounting; 
heirs contended that property could not go to adoptee because not 
“issue of her body.” Testamentary trust for testator’s daughter, then to 
the issue of her body, but if none, to testator’s sons.  Daughter survived
by her adopted daughter). 
In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562, 562–63 (Iowa 1985) (trustee 
filed declaratory action to resolve whether adopted grandchild was “issue;” 
her uncle, testator’s son who would receive all instead of half to adoptee, 
testified that testator intended to distinguish between adopted and natural 
children).
Nunnally v. Tr. Co. Bank, 252 S.E.2d 468, 468 (Ga. 1979), aff’d, 261 
S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 1979) (trustee initiated suit for construction of will to 
determine if adopted great-grandchildren included in trust.  Testamentary
trust for daughter for life, then to daughter’s four children or to the issue 
of predeceased child.  One grandchild adopted two sons). 
Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206, 1206 (Ohio 1986) (trustee 
filed construction action for inter vivos trust; natural child and adoptees 
filed cross motions for summary judgment. The 1944 trust provided for 
settlor’s daughter, with ultimate distribution to settlor’s living grandchildren
and to the living children of each deceased grandchild.  One grandson adopted 
his two stepdaughters, then died survived by the two adoptees and a natural 
son). 
Ortega v. First Republicbank Fort Worth, N.A., 792 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex.
1990) originally sub nom. Martin v. Neel, 379 S.W.2d 422, 422 (Tex. 1964) 
(trustee brought suit to construe the trust created in the will as to whether 
adopted great-grandchildren were beneficiaries; adoptees appealed in 1964 
and again in 1990. Testamentary trust for the children of deceased’s 
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granddaughter, including “great-grandchildren who may be born after my 
death.”). 
Parker v. Mullen, 255 A.2d 851, 852 (Conn. 1969) (trustees filed final
account for distribution to living children of testator’s brothers, sisters,
brothers-in-law, and sister-in-law; one natural beneficiary objected to 
the inclusion of an adopted child as beneficiary).
Pate v. Ford, 360 S.E.2d 145, 145; (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (executor and trustee 
petitioned to construe wills on whether “natural born grandchildren” included 
those born after wills executed), rev’d, 376 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1989). 
Penland v. Agnich, 940 S.W.2d 324, 324 (Tex. App. 1997) (trustees brought 
a declaratory judgment action to construe “lawful issue” in testamentary 
trust; natural grandchildren appealed against adopted grandchildren.  It 
is unclear if they are siblings or cousins). 
In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353, 353 (Penn. 1966) (in trust accounting,
issue arose whether son’s adopted daughter was “issue;” court awarded 
balance of trust to settlor’s brother). 
In re Pierce’s Estate, 196 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1948) (trustee petitioned for 
instructions on whether adopted children of deceased nephew were 
beneficiaries; trustee, also a beneficiary, appealed order declaring that 
adoptees were beneficiaries. Testamentary trust for children of a deceased 
niece and nephew for life, then to their lawful issue.  One beneficiary, the 
nephew’s son, survived by two adopted stepdaughters).
R.I. Hosp. Tr. Co. v. Hooker, 219 A.2d 772, 772 (R.I. 1966) (action by
trustee to determine if adopted child entitled to share of income.  Testamentary 
trust for niece for life, then to her children.  Niece survived by three natural 
children and an adopted child, the child of her predeceased daughter). 
Scribner v. Barry, 489 A.2d 8, 8 (Me. 1985) (co-trustees petitioned for 
construction of testamentary trust; appealed by adopted grandson against 
testator’s daughter and daughter’s two children).
Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1967)
(trustee petitioned for construction of will; trustee and natural nieces and 
nephews of testator alleged that testator’s adopted grandchild could 
not take as “issue.”), overruled by Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. 
Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
Sennot v. Collet-Oser, 344 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (trustees 
sued for construction of inter vivos trust to determine “surviving issue” of 
son’s and daughter’s trust; determined it did not included adopted grandchildren
but only natural grandchildren. Natural grandchild moved for judgment
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on the pleadings or summary judgment that adopted grandchildren
had no interest in trust. Adoptees appealed).
In re Thompson, 250 A.2d 393, 393 (N.J. 1969) (in an accounting action,
trust paid to natural grandchild but not adopted grandchild, his brother; 
adoptee objected). 
Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Andrews, 142 S.E.2d 182, 184–85 (N.C. 
1965) (trustee instituted action for judicial determination of rights of 
parties; natural born nieces, nephews, great nieces, and great nephews
asserted that adopted children were not beneficiaries of trust as great
nieces and nephews.  First cousins against first cousins).
Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1965) (Trustee brought account for testamentary trust, with payment 
to testator’s adopted granddaughter’s child; testator’s son’s widow appealed). 
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 499 (W. Va. 
1977) (Trustee brought declaratory judgment for aid in construing inter 
vivos trust which provided for son for life, then to son’s widow and his 
children or descendants.  Son adopted his two stepdaughters; adopted
stepdaughters, the testator’s grandchildren, appealed). 
Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 876, 876–77 (Ala. 1976) (trustee sought
construction of an inter vivos trust providing for “children now or later born
to my son.” Son had three natural children and one adopted).
Zimmerman v. First Nat’l Bank, 348 So. 1359, 1360–62 (Ala. 1977)
(trustee brought declaratory judgment actions to construe the testamentary 
trusts: all the rest in trust for daughter for life, then to daughter’s children
for their education and support, with half paid as each attains twenty-five
and other half at thirty-five years of age.  Daughter was survived by two natural 
children and three adopted children). 
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IX. APPENDIX D: NO CONFLICT WITH NATURAL 
RELATIVES OR CANNOT TELL 
Bowles v. Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 811 (S.C. 1995) (adopted great-
granddaughter filed suit for order construing “issue” in irrevocable inter
vivos trust and will to include her; guardian ad litem for potential beneficiaries 
appealed). 
Bradford v. Johnson, 75 S.E.2d 632, 632–34 (N.C. 1953) (trustee brought 
declaratory judgment action; appealed by guardian ad litem for issue of
natural nieces and nephews.  One nephew had adopted a son, and the daughter
of a nephew had adopted a daughter).
Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 629–30 (Iowa 1930) (suit filed on
behalf of adopted granddaughter to construe grandfather’s will; estate divided 
equally between testator’s two sons; adopted granddaughter appealed). 
Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816,
816–17 (Mich. 1967) (adopted son sued to be deemed the issue of testator’s 
niece; if no issue, gift over to Salvation Army).
Langhorne v. Langhorne, 186 S.E.2d 50, 50–51 (Va. 1972) (“[w]hen
distribution of trust was sought,” court ordered it distributed to two natural 
grandchildren; adopted grandchild appealed). 
Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 614–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1923) (adopted grandchild sued to construe testamentary trust for daughter
for life, then to daughter’s children, with gift over to university. Daughter
was survived by adopted child). 
Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Trust of Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 
885 (Mont. 1958) (no description of how suit started; adopted grandson 
appealed. Testamentary trust gave half of income to one son and other 
half to other son; if either died before age fifty leaving issue and wife then
that son’s share to issue and wife; otherwise, to other son). 
In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601, 601 (Pa. 1918) (will left estate to
testator’s son for life, then to his children, with gift over to residuary legatees.
Son died leaving only adopted child; no indication residuary legatees were
related to testator). 
In re Smith’s Will, 112 A. 897, 899 (Vt. 1921) (no description of how suit
started; probate court ruled that adopted granddaughter was issue entitled to 
income of testamentary trust; someone appealed, and Vermont Supreme 
Court reversed). 
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Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 797 (Pa. 1972) (adopted grandchildren sought 
to take under testamentary trust as children of deceased son, along with 
testator’s natural grandchildren; adoptees appealed). 
Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 498–99 (S.C. 1973) (legatee under 
son’s will sued adopted grandson; legatee appealed). 
In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821, 821–22 (Me. 1907) (administrator of will
filed accounting distributing remainder to testator’s natural grandchildren
and son; adopted granddaughter appealed). 
Ziehl v. Maine Nat’l Bank, 383 A.2d 1364, 1364–66 (Me. 1978) (suit for 
declaratory judgment brought on behalf of adopted granddaughter; cannot 
tell if contingent beneficiaries are related to testator). 
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X. APPENDIX E: ALL OR NOTHING LIST
Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 131 A. 54, 54 (N.J. 1925) (uncle filed action in
ejectment against adopted nephew). 
Bagwell v. Alexander, 329 S.E.2d 771, 771–72 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (life 
tenant and his adopted son filed suit against life tenant’s brothers and 
sisters and their issue for an order for the sale of real property bequeathed 
to life tenant and his surviving children). 
Bilsky v. Bilsky, 455 S.W.2d 901, 901–03 (Ark. 1970) (trustee filed petition
for construction of “issue” in trust; natural son appealed against his adopted 
niece).
Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 744 (Tenn. 1988) (natural son of 
testator’s niece claimed entire principal of trust against children of niece’s
adopted grandson, his cousins; grandchildren filed action).
Casper v. Helvie, 146 N.E. 123, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925) (natural grandson’s 
action for partition of real property against adopted granddaughter, his 
cousin).
Cochran v. Cochran, 95 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (executor sued
for construction of will “if son dies without issue, then to two of T’s 
grandchildren;” grandchildren appealed against son’s wife).
Conn. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bovey, 292 A.2d 899, 900 (Conn. 1972)
(action by trustee for construction of whether “child” or “children” in an 
inter vivos trust includes an adopted child; appealed by adopted grandchild).
Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 629 (Iowa 1930) (suit filed on behalf 
of adopted granddaughter to construe grandfather’s will that if daughter 
died without direct heirs her share went to testator’s sons; estate divided 
equally between testator’s two sons; adopted granddaughter appealed). 
Everett v. Dockery, 33 So. 2d 313 (Miss. 1948) (suit probably initiated by
executor, possibly Everett, for construction of will.  Held life estates to
son and daughter, then to their children, but if died without issue, to other 
sibling.  Appeal by son and his children against his sister’s adopted children).
Veneklasen v. Salvation Army (In re Estate of Graham), 150 N.W.2d 816,
816 (Mich. 1967) (adopted son sued to be deemed the “issue” of testator’s 
niece; if no issue, gift over to Salvation Army).
Graves v. Graves, 163 S.W.2d 544, 544, 544 (Mo. 1942) (adopted nephew’s 
child filed petition to construe testator’s will against trustee and testator’s 
natural nephew; trustee and nephew, adoptee’s uncle, demurred; adoptee 
appealed. Will devised land to two nephews and heirs of their bodies; 
354
KNAPLUND_57-2_POST KNAPLUND PAGES-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2020 1:02 PM      
 















   
 
   
[VOL. 57:  301, 2020] Children of Assisted Reproduction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
testamentary trust paid half of principal to each nephew at age forty or if 
died before to pay to survivor.  Adoptee does not count, and all went to 
other nephew). 
Kindred v. Anderson, 209 S.W.2d 912, 912, 912 (Mo. 1948) (nephew/
natural relative sued alleging adoptee could not take as “issue.” Will devised 
property to her son but if he died without issue, to testator’s other children. 
Son died survived by adopted daughter).
In re Leask, 90 N.E. 652, 654 (N.Y. 1910) (trustees filed accounting;
adopted grandchild objected because trustees did not account to her or
recognize her as beneficiary, but named testator’s nieces and nephews 
instead.  Testamentary trust for testator’s son for life, then to son’s surviving 
child). 
Fithian v. Papalini (In re Estates of Leggett), 378 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Mich. 
1985) (daughter’s adopted child brought successful claim to take under a 
testamentary trust; natural children of other daughter appealed; reversed; 
adopted child appealed; reversed.  Testamentary trust for daughter for life, 
then to her issue; otherwise to other daughter.  Daughter survived by adopted 
child). 
Melek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 250 S.W. 614, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1923) (adopted grandchild sued to construe testamentary trust for daughter
for life, then to daughter’s children, with gift over to university. Daughter
was survived by adopted child). 
Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Trust of Miller), 323 P.2d 885, 
885 (Mont. 1958) (no description of how suit started; adopted grandson 
appealed.  Testamentary trust gave half of income to one son and other half 
to other son; if either died before age fifty leaving issue and wife then that
son’s share to issue and wife; otherwise to other son). 
Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 268 (Okla. 1967) (trustee filed an
accounting; heirs contended that property could not go to adoptee because
not “issue of her body.” Testamentary trust for testator’s daughter, then
to the issue of her body, but if none, to testator’s sons.  Daughter survived
by her adopted daughter). 
In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353, 353 (Penn. 1966) (in trust 
accounting, issue arose whether son’s adopted daughter was “issue;” court 
awarded balance of trust to settlor’s brother). 
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In re Puterbaugh’s Estate, 104 A. 601 (Pa. 1918) (will left estate to testator’s
son for life, then to his children, with gift over to residuary legatees.  Son 
died leaving only adopted daughter; no indication residuary legatees were
related to testator). 
Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1983) (adopted great-
granddaughter filed action to interpret deed against her aunt and uncle; 
adoptee appealed. Deed gave granddaughter a life estate, then to heirs of
her body; court held that adopted great-granddaughter was not heir of her 
body).
Trueax v. Black, 335 P.2d 52, 52 (Wash. 1959) (testator’s natural children 
and two grandchildren and adopted grandchild had contesting claims for 
ownership of farmland in decedent’s will.  Will gave farmland to daughter 
for life, then to her children; if none, to testator’s other children and two named
grandchildren. Daughter adopted her niece, testator’s grandchild not named
in will, and died survived only by adoptee). 
Turner v. Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 498 (S.C. 1973) (legatee under son’s will 
sued adopted grandson; legatee appealed). 
Hutton v. Ribsamen (In re Washburn’s Will), 264 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1965) (trustee brought account for testamentary trust, with payment 
to testator’s adopted granddaughter’s child; testator’s son’s widow appealed). 
Sec. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 114 (W. Va. 1967)
(Trustee petitioned for construction of will; trustee and natural nieces and
nephews of testator alleged that testator’s adopted grandchild could not 
take as “issue.”), overruled by Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Hanes,
237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
356
